44 F.4th 140
2d Cir.2022Background
- Alstom S.A. is a French multinational; Alstom Power, Inc. (API) is its U.S. subsidiary based in Connecticut. Lawrence Hoskins worked for an Alstom UK subsidiary assigned to the International Network (IN) in France as Area SVP for Asia.
- The Tarahan Project: API and affiliates pursued a $118 million Indonesian power contract and retained consultants who paid bribes to Indonesian officials to secure the award.
- At trial the government alleged Hoskins helped identify and approve consultants, coordinated terms with API executives (notably Pierucci), attended meetings in Jakarta, and directed IN staff to execute consulting agreements and payment arrangements.
- Hoskins was indicted (2013) on FCPA and money‑laundering counts. On interlocutory appeal (Hoskins I) the Second Circuit held conspiracy/complicity theories cannot expand the FCPA beyond its enumerated categories of persons.
- The government proceeded on an alternative theory that Hoskins was an “agent of a domestic concern” (API). A jury convicted him on FCPA and money‑laundering counts, but the district court granted a Rule 29 acquittal on the FCPA counts, concluding the evidence did not establish an agency relationship with API.
- The Second Circuit affirmed the acquittal on the FCPA counts and also upheld the district court’s rulings denying dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment, and rejecting Hoskins’s challenges to jury instructions on withdrawal and venue; Judge Lohier concurred in part and dissented in part on the agency issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Hoskins) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence proved Hoskins was an “agent of a domestic concern” under the FCPA | Hoskins acted on API’s behalf: he selected/approved consultants, followed API directions, and his actions furthered API’s scheme | Hoskins worked for a separate IN function, not API; API lacked power to hire/fire or control him and he lacked authority to bind API | Affirmed acquittal: record insufficient to prove an agency/principal‑agent relationship beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether the district court erred in denying dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment | Retroactive ends‑of‑justice exclusions were proper; delays attributable to both sides; Barker factors do not require dismissal | Delay was extraordinary and prejudicial; retroactive STA exclusions improper | Affirmed: district court’s retroactive ends‑of‑justice findings and Barker balancing were not reversible error |
| Whether jury instructions on withdrawal from conspiracy were erroneous | Withdrawal requires an affirmative act disavowing/defeating the conspiracy; resignation alone is insufficient; instruction’s examples appropriate | Resignation or ceasing business activity should suffice to withdraw; instruction improperly required weakening foreseeable consequences | Affirmed: instruction correct under Smith and circuit precedent; withdrawal not a defense to aiding and abetting |
| Whether venue instructions for money‑laundering counts were incorrect | Multi‑step transfers can be a single continuing transaction under §1956 so venue in Connecticut is proper where part of the transaction occurred | The transfers were separate transactions, so venue in Connecticut is improper for some counts | Affirmed: jury instruction correct; government proved venue by preponderance and Dinero Express supports single‑transaction view |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2018) (limits on conspiracy/complicity liability under the FCPA)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Pauling, 924 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2019) (elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; inferences must be supported)
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (timing and recordation of ends‑of‑justice findings under the STA)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial balancing test)
- Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013) (withdrawal from conspiracy requires affirmative act to disavow or defeat the conspiracy)
- United States v. Dinero Express, Inc., 313 F.3d 803 (2d Cir. 2002) (multi‑step money transfers may be a single transaction under §1956)
- United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964) (one who sets a conspiracy in motion cannot simply walk away; must take affirmative steps to withdraw)
- United States v. Nerlinger, 862 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1988) (resignation plus affirmative acts can constitute withdrawal)
- United States v. LaMorte, 950 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1990) (examples of withdrawal approved in jury charge)
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) (aiding and abetting knowledge analysis; withdrawal not a defense to substantive aiding and abetting)
- United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to treat sequential transfers as separate events for venue)
- United States v. Breen, 243 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 2001) (ends‑of‑justice findings need not use talismanic words if factors were considered)
- United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (deference to district court in Barker balancing)
- United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence on appeal)