United States v. Holmes
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4104
| 4th Cir. | 2012Background
- Holmes, while in the Air Force at Yokota Air Base, allegedly forced his stepdaughter TB to perform oral sex on two occasions in 1999 and 2002 when TB was under nine.
- Holmes and TB's mother J.H. were married during the acts and divorced in 2003; TB later recounted the accusations but initially recanted.
- OSI investigated after TB renewed accusations in 2007; Holmes returned from Qatar and was questioned by OSI at Langley AFB.
- Holmes gave oral and written statements, waiving rights after Miranda-like advisement; he admitted molesting TB in a written and oral statement.
- Indictments were filed in the ED Va; the first indictment was dismissed, a second indictment led to dismissal of venue, and a third indictment (operative) proceeded in the district court.
- The district court denied motions to dismiss for venue/jurisdiction and to suppress statements; it also denied a motion to exclude an expert (Dr. Ofshe) later.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Holmes' statements to OSI were involuntary | Holmes argues will was overborne by interrogation circumstances. | Holmes contends coercive tactics and inducements tainted the confession. | Statements were voluntary; no coercion found. |
| Whether venue lay in the ED Va for the third indictment | Venue depended on the North Carolina arrest per Doumar denial; first arrest under first indictment lacked jurisdiction. | Venue should be proper where the defendant was first arrested for the charged offenses. | Venue proper in ED Va based on offense-specific first arrest there. |
| Whether the district court erred in excluding Dr. Ofshe under Rule 16 | Disclosure was timely and sufficient under Rule 16(b)(1)(C). | Disclosure was untimely and inadequate to describe bases for opinions; prejudicial to defense. | Exclusion affirmed; disclosure deficient and untimely. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777 (4th Cir. 1997) (coercion threshold; substantive voluntariness analysis)
- United States v. Guay, 108 F.3d 545 (4th Cir. 1997) ( Miranda waiver validity and voluntariness analysis)
- United States v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2002) (mental state and coercion in voluntariness inquiry)
- United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987) (police representations and coercion not per se coercive)
- United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809 (4th Cir. 1995) (timeliness of expert disclosure and prejudice considerations)
- United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973) (venue for extraterritorial offenses; offense-based venue approach)
- United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (offense-based venue where arrested for the charge)
- United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1954) (venue determined by arrest for the specific offense)
- United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1984) (focus on arrest location for offense in venue analysis)
- Cores v. United States, 356 U.S. 405 (1958) (general principle for proper venue and trial locality)
- United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878 (4th Cir. 2001) (trial‑related evidentiary discretion; abuse of discretion standard)