United States v. Ho Ka Yung, 37 F.4th 70

Defendant Ho Ka Terence Yung conducted an extensive online and real-world harassment campaign after a negative Georgetown Law interview: fake obituaries and social‑media profiles, defamatory blog posts, false reports, sexual‑advertisement impersonations, and recruiting strangers to contact the interviewer's family.
FBI and private investigators traced the harassment to Yung; he was charged under the federal cyberstalking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, and pleaded guilty after litigating (and losing) a facial overbreadth challenge.
Plea agreement waived most appeals but reserved the right to appeal the statute’s overbreadth ruling and sentences above statutory maximums; Yung was sentenced to ~4 years imprisonment, 3 years’ probation, and ordered to pay restitution: nearly $70,000 to the interviewer (investigative costs) and ~$130,000 to Georgetown (security measures).
On appeal Yung renewed his facial overbreadth challenge to § 2261A and contested the restitution order; the government relied partly on Yung’s appellate waiver.
The Third Circuit considered (1) whether the cyberstalking statute is facially overbroad under the First Amendment, and (2) whether appellate waiver barred review of restitution and whether restitution awarded to the interviewer and Georgetown was statutorily authorized.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) is facially overbroad (intent prong: "harass"/"intimidate")	Statute criminalizes substantial protected speech because "harass"/"intimidate" are broad and could cover nonviolent, offensive communications	The statute can be read to target unprotected conduct (true threats / harassment integral to criminal conduct); intent element narrows scope	Court adopted a limiting construction: "intimidate" = put victim in fear of death or serious bodily injury; "harass" = distress by threatening/intimidating conduct integral to crime. Statute not facially overbroad; conviction affirmed.
Whether appellate waiver bars review and whether restitution awards were authorized	Yung: waiver prevents appeal; alternatively, restitution exceeds statutory authorization	Gov: waiver bars appeal; restitution to both interviewer and Georgetown authorized under special and general restitution statutes	Waiver unenforceable to bar review of whether restitution exceeded statutory authorization (separation‑of‑powers concern). Restitution to interviewer (investigative costs/attorneys’ fees) upheld as proximate and foreseeable under § 2264; restitution to Georgetown vacated—Georgetown was not a direct victim under § 2264 and had no compensable property damage under the general restitution statute.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats unprotected)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (certain categories of unprotected speech)
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine")
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement standard)
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (offensive, emotionally distressing speech may be protected)
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (parody and emotional distress protected absent false statements of fact)
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014) (proximate causation principles in restitution statutes)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (standards for knowing and voluntary guilty pleas)
Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (canon against surplusage)
United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (prior Third Circuit decision addressing § 2261A)
United States v. Ackell, 907 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2018) (interpreting § 2261A intent elements and narrowing construction)
United States v. Fleury, 20 F.4th 1353 (11th Cir. 2021) (upholding § 2261A under a limiting construction)