United States v. Hill, 187 F. Supp. 3d 959

Hill pleaded guilty to a federal heroin conspiracy carrying a 10-year statutory minimum after having earlier pleaded guilty in state court for related conduct and served ~27 months in state custody.
Hill was released from state custody on July 5, 2011; he was arrested on federal charges three months later and later pled guilty in federal court.
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) permits concurrent federal and state sentences only when the defendant is subject to an undischarged term; it contains no express mechanism to run a federal sentence concurrently with a discharged (already completed) prior state sentence.
Seventh Circuit precedent allows district courts to adjust federal sentences to account for time already served on an undischarged state sentence so that the aggregate prison time meets a statutory minimum (e.g., Ross, Hernandez, Campbell).
Seventh Circuit authority (e.g., Cruz, Blackwell) has held that a discharged prior sentence generally cannot be used to reduce a federal sentence below a statutory minimum, though guideline commentary (U.S.S.G. § 5K2.23) contemplates downward departures for completed prior imprisonment in some circumstances.
The district court found § 3584’s discharged/undischarged distinction arbitrary as applied to Hill, held it violated due process, and imposed a 93-month federal sentence so that Hill’s aggregate custody (27 + 93 months) equaled the 10-year statutory minimum.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 3584’s distinction between discharged and undischarged prior sentences, as applied to a defendant who has completed a state sentence for related conduct and faces a federal statutory minimum, violates the Due Process Clause	Hill: the discharged/undischarged distinction is arbitrary; due process (per Chapman) forbids sentencing disparities based on the happenstance of sentencing timing, so the court may reduce the federal sentence so the aggregate equals the statutory minimum	Government: § 3584 permits concurrency/adjustment only for undischarged sentences; the distinction is rational (e.g., certainty, contingencies with undischarged terms) and constitutional per circuit precedent	Court: § 3584’s distinction, as applied here, is arbitrary and violates the Fifth Amendment; the court may impose a federal sentence below the statutory minimum when combined with time already served on a discharged, related state sentence the aggregate equals the minimum; Hill sentenced to 93 months (27 + 93 = 10 years)

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991) (due process forbids arbitrary sentencing distinctions)
United States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2000) (district court may adjust federal sentence to account for time served on an undischarged related state sentence so aggregate meets statutory minimum)
United States v. Cruz, 595 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2010) (discharged prior sentence may not be used to reduce a federal sentence below a statutory minimum)
United States v. Hernandez, 620 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2010) (district court may impose federal sentence below statutory minimum to account for undischarged state time)
United States v. Campbell, 617 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010) (vacating sentence for failure to account for undischarged state time when imposing mandatory minimum)
United States v. Blackwell, 49 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding denial of credit for discharged sentence but noting potential constitutional argument)
United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting constitutional challenge to § 3584’s distinction)
United States v. Otto, 176 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding distinction between discharged and undischarged sentences as rational)
United States v. Dunham, 295 F.3d 605 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding guideline distinction to preserve parity in federal sentences)