United States v. Hill
Criminal No. 2019-0374
D.D.C.Jul 20, 2021Background
- Indictment alleges two related conspiracies to funnel nearly $5 million into the 2016 presidential election; Khawaja is the alleged hub who provided funds to others.
- Rani El‑Saadi and Stevan Hill are charged under 52 U.S.C. § 30122 with making/permitting their names to be used to effect conduit contributions (and aiding and abetting) after receiving funds from Khawaja.
- Relevant transactions: El‑Saadi allegedly routed $150,000 from his company to a personal check to Political Committee 2 (a joint fundraising committee); Hill allegedly wrote $100,000 to Political Committee 2 and later other checks to Political Committees 6 and 7.
- Political Committee 2 was a joint fundraising committee that allocated proceeds to participating committees, including Political Committee 5, which is based in the District of Columbia.
- El‑Saadi moved to dismiss Count 18 (conduit charge) for improper venue and to sever his trial; Hill adopted El‑Saadi’s venue arguments for Counts 19, 27, and 41. The government opposed. The Court denied both defendants’ motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper venue for conduit‑contribution counts | Venue is proper where contribution was sent, received, or accepted; DC is proper where recipient committee accepted/received/reported the funds | Venue proper only where contribution was "made" (sent/initiated); contributions at issue were received/deposited outside DC | Denied dismissal; court holds venue may lie where contribution was received or accepted; government must prove location by preponderance at trial |
| When a conduit contribution is "effected" (complete) | Contribution is not complete until recipient accepts/deposits it (acceptance completes the subterfuge) | Contribution completed when mailed/handed over (Hankin/Passodelis) or when first recipient deposited funds; thus venue lies where initial receipt/deposit occurred | Court holds "effect" requires receipt plus acceptance by recipient; Chestnut (receipt/deposit) not controlling here; acceptance is key for completion |
| Effect of joint‑fundraising committee (JFC) transfers on venue | JFC receipt/disbursement rules make participating committees' receipt simultaneous with JFC; participating committee in DC can accept/report funds, supporting venue in DC | JFC receipt outside DC and later disbursement/transfer to a DC participant is too attenuated to establish venue in DC | Court concludes JFC regulations cut both ways; participating committees’ receipt may be treated as received for reporting, but venue in DC depends on whether the participating committee actually accepted/screened the contribution in DC; dismissal denied pending proof at trial |
| Motion to sever El‑Saadi's trial | Joint trial is efficient and evidence overlaps; limiting instructions suffice | El‑Saadi had minimal, early role and risk of guilt "rubbing off" from heavier evidence against co‑defendants; severance required to avoid prejudice | Denied; court favors joinder, finds overlapping evidence and that limiting instructions and jury personalization should avoid undue prejudice; will reconsider if actual prejudice arises |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chestnut, 533 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding deposit can establish receipt/acceptance for a receiving/accepting unlawful contribution charge)
- United States v. Hankin, 607 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding a contribution was complete when made/received for statute‑of‑limitations purposes)
- United States v. Passodelis, 615 F.2d 975 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Hankin to venue for excessive contribution; contribution complete before deposit)
- United States v. Morgan, 393 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (articulating locus delicti test for venue: identify conduct and location of acts)
- Lam Kwong‑Wah v. United States, 924 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (government must prove venue by preponderance; venue may be proper in multiple districts)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (standard for severance under Rule 14; limiting instructions often cure prejudice)
- United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (discussing severance where disparity of evidence risks transference of guilt)