786 F.3d 1254
10th Cir.2015Background
- Dejuan Hill was indicted in a multi-defendant, ten-count indictment charging a global conspiracy (2009–2011) to rob banks, a credit union, and pharmacies; he was also charged with robbing Arvest Bank (Nov. 5, 2011) and a § 924(c) firearm offense arising from that bank robbery.
- Law enforcement linked several robberies to members/affiliates of the Hoover Crips; police certified Hill as a Hoover Crip and he had a gang tattoo.
- Key evidence tying Hill to the Arvest robbery: Officer Johnson’s identification of Hill driving a black Nissan away from the back alley of 1107 E. Pine minutes after the robbery; GPS/tracer and most stolen money were located at that address; one set of robber clothes and a pistol were found there; cell‑phone tower records showed communications/movement consistent with coordination among Vernon, Stanley, and phones registered to Whitney Landrum; bank video and eyewitnesses described a second robber similar in height/complexion to Hill.
- Little direct evidence linked Hill to the other robberies in the indictment; the government’s proof of a larger, global conspiracy relied largely on gang-affiliation testimony and Hill’s tattoo.
- At trial Hill was convicted on (1) Count One (global conspiracy), (2) Count Nine (Arvest Bank robbery), and (3) Count Ten (§ 924(c)). He appealed raising sufficiency, variance/misjoinder/severance, and Rule 403 challenges to gang evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hill) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Arvest robbery | Evidence was circumstantial and insufficient to prove Hill was the second robber or a conspirator | Circumstantial evidence (eye‑witness/ video, Johnson’s ID, GPS/tracer, recovered money, missing second outfit, and cell‑phone movement/calls) permits reasonable inferences of guilt | Conviction affirmed: evidence sufficient to support robbery and related conspiracy convictions |
| Variance between Indictment (global conspiracy) and proof (smaller conspiracies) | The government proved multiple discrete conspiracies, not the single global conspiracy charged; variance prejudiced Hill through spillover | Although a variance existed, any prejudice was not substantial; Hill had notice and the evidence of the Arvest conspiracy was sufficient and not overwhelmed by other evidence | Affirmed: variance found but not prejudicial; no relief granted |
| Misjoinder / Severance (Rules 8 & 14) | Joinder was improper because Hill was allegedly involved only in the Arvest robbery; joint trial caused guilt‑by‑association prejudice warranting severance | Rule 8 allows broad joinder; Rule 14 requires a strong showing of specific prejudice, which Hill did not make; limiting instruction was given | Affirmed: joinder and denial of severance not reversible error |
| Admission of gang‑affiliation evidence (Rule 403) | Gang evidence was irrelevant to the Arvest charges and unfairly prejudicial (risk of guilt by association) | Gang evidence was probative of conspiracy and membership; district court did not abuse discretion in Rule 403 balancing | Affirmed: district court acted within discretion; gang evidence admissible and not unfairly prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (circumstantial evidence can sustain a criminal conviction)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (variance and en masse trials risk spillover prejudice; context‑sensitive inquiry)
- United States v. Carnegie, 533 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (framework for assessing prejudicial spillover from multiple conspiracies)
- United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2005) (limits on convictions supported by attenuated circumstantial inferences)
- United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2013) (gang‑affiliation testimony may be relevant in conspiracy prosecutions; Rule 403 balancing)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (Rule 14: remedial measures like limiting instructions may cure joinder prejudice)
- United States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1991) (compare volume/quality of relevant vs. irrelevant evidence when assessing spillover risk)