United States v. Hernandez
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17522
| 10th Cir. | 2011Background
- Hernandez was convicted in 2004 of possessing an unregistered firearm and sentenced to 46 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.
- After release, Hernandez violated supervised release, and the district court revoked it under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), imposing six months in prison and a new term of supervised release.
- Hernandez violated the second term of supervision, leading to a three-month prison sentence and another supervised-release term; this pattern continued with subsequent revocations.
- A third violation resulted in a twelve-month prison term and a further supervised-release term; after the fourth violation, the district court imposed an eighteen-month prison sentence with no supervised release.
- Hernandez challenged the eighteenth-month sentence as beyond the authority of § 3583(e)(3), arguing his prior prison terms should be creditable and aggregated to limit total imprisonment.
- The court held that the plain language of the 2003 amendment to § 3583(e)(3) limits each revocation to a two-year maximum for class C felonies, not an aggregate total across revocations, and affirmed the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of 'except that' in § 3583(e)(3). | Hernandez: aggregate prior terms; overall cap exceeds two years. | Hernandez: per-revocation cap and aggregation rule should apply. | Statute permits two-year cap per revocation; aggregation not allowed. |
| Effect of the 2003 amendment adding 'on any such revocation'. | Aggregation permissible prior to amendment; Congress intended aggregation for all revocations. | Amendment forecloses aggregation across revocations for all offenders. | Amendment unambiguously prohibits aggregation across revocations; applies to all offenders. |
| Relation between § 3583(e)(3) and § 3583(h) regarding maximum supervised release. | Aggregation could create perpetual cycles with back-to-back revocations. | § 3583(h) requires crediting prior prison terms against the new supervised-release term. | § 3583(h) prevents endless cycles by limiting total supervised release based on time already served. |
| Legislative intent and titles/captions guiding interpretation. | Title of PROTECT Act suggests sex-offender focus, implying aggregation should persist for others. | Titles cannot limit plain statutory text; amendment applies broadly. | Court rejects title-based limitations; plain text governs. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Swenson, 289 F.3d 676 (10th Cir. 2002) (aggregation prior to amendment discussed)
- United States v. Jackson, 329 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2003) (aggregation principles pre-amendment)
- United States v. Hampton, 633 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2011) (interpreting 'on any such revocation' post-amendment)
- United States v. Epstein, 620 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2010) (post-amendment interpretation of § 3583(e)(3))
- United States v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (interpretation of 'offense that resulted in the term of supervised release')
- United States v. Lewis, 519 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2008) (aggregation considerations in revocation context)
- Tapia-Escalera v. United States, 356 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussion of 'offense that resulted in the term' language)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (crediting time and related statutory interpretation principles)