United States v. Henry Wood
16 F.4th 529
| 7th Cir. | 2021Background
- Henry Wood was on Indiana parole with a written condition that his person, residence, and property could be subject to reasonable searches by supervising officers.
- Wood failed to report to his supervising officer; parole agents arrested him at home under a parole arrest warrant.
- During a frisk and handling of his phone, agents removed the phone’s back cover and found methamphetamine; the phone was seized as evidence.
- Seven days later an Indiana investigator performed a warrantless data extraction of the seized phone; the extraction revealed child pornography, which led to an FBI warrant and a federal indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
- Wood moved to suppress the extracted data arguing Riley v. California requires a warrant for cellphone data; the district court denied suppression, Wood pleaded guilty reserving the suppression appeal, and he appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Wood's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Riley v. California requires a warrant before searching a parolee's cellphone data | Riley governs and requires a warrant for cellphone data because of heightened privacy interests | Riley addressed searches incident to arrest; parolee searches are governed by parole-search precedents (Knights/Samson) and Riley is not dispositive | Riley does not automatically apply; context-specific balancing controls and Riley is not transplanted to parole searches |
| Whether a warrantless post‑seizure data extraction of a parolee's phone is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment | The search was an investigatory intrusion requiring a warrant | Wood’s parole status and written search condition greatly diminished his privacy; state interests in supervision, reducing recidivism, and reintegration justify warrantless searches under Knights and Samson | Warrantless data extraction was reasonable under the totality-of-circumstances framework (Knights/Samson) |
| Whether Wood waived challenges to the exterior-phone search and the home search | Those searches were unlawful and should have been considered | Trial counsel expressly declined to challenge the phone-cover search and home search at the suppression hearing | Wood waived those additional suppression arguments by counsel’s affirmative statements |
| Whether the parole agreement authorized searches only for "ongoing" violations so post‑arrest searches lack reasonable cause | Once arrested, a parolee cannot be in imminent danger of violating parole, so the agreement bars searches after arrest | Indiana law and practical reading allow searches based on reasonable cause tied to parole supervision; an "ongoing violation" reading would be absurd and undermine supervision | The parole provision does not foreclose post-arrest searches; the agreement and precedent permit searches under Knights/Samson and any narrow contractual violation does not automatically create a Fourth Amendment violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (cellphone data generally receives heightened Fourth Amendment protection; search-incident-to-arrest exception limited)
- United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (probationer searches reasonable under totality-of-circumstances with reasonable suspicion)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (suspicionless parolee searches reasonable given diminished expectations and state supervision interests)
- United States v. Caya, 956 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. application of Knights/Samson to extended supervision/home search)
- United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir. decision distinguishing probationer cellphone searches where agreement did not clearly include phones)
- United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. probationer cellphone-search decision stressing clear notice and Riley considerations)