United States v. Henry Williams, 424 U.S. App. D.C. 68

Background

FBI and local police investigated a Washington, D.C. cocaine-distribution conspiracy (Jan 2009–Apr 2011). Wiretaps on two Bowman-associated lines (TT2, TT3) and surveillance, pen registers, confidential sources, undercover buys, and search warrants were used; evidence seized from storage units and residences.
Defendants: Henry Williams, Gezo Edwards, and William Bowman. All convicted of conspiracy; Bowman also convicted of multiple distribution and firearms counts; Edwards acquitted of firearms at trial but received a sentence enhancement for weapon possession at sentencing. Sentences: Williams 51 months, Bowman 45 years, Edwards life.
Pretrial, Bowman and Edwards moved to suppress wiretap-derived evidence alleging Title III and Fourth Amendment defects; district court denied suppression and refused a Franks hearing. Williams moved (unsuccessfully) to sever. Bowman was offered a "wired" plea contingent on Williams pleading guilty; neither accepted.
At trial FBI SA John Bevington testified as both an expert (drug terminology) and as a lay-opinion witness interpreting wiretap recordings and surveillance. Defense objected to the latter. The jury relied on wiretap/audio/video evidence and cooperating witnesses.
On appeal the D.C. Circuit affirmed most rulings but found the district court erred in admitting portions of Bevington’s lay-opinion testimony under FRE 701 and that error was not harmless as to Williams; Williams’s conviction was reversed and remanded. Other challenges (wiretap necessity, naming, Franks hearing, wired plea, sentencing on acquitted conduct) were rejected.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were Franks hearings required for omissions in wiretap affidavits (pen register on TT3, CS-4)?	Appellants: omissions were material and entitled them to Franks hearings.	Gov’t: omitted details were not material and would not have defeated necessity/probable cause.	No Franks hearing required; omissions not materially likely to change necessity/probable-cause assessment.
Did wiretap affidavits fail Title III necessity and naming requirements (incl. failure to name Edwards in Mar. 11 application)?	Appellants: affidavits lacked "full and complete" statements re other techniques and failed to name Edwards, so authorizations were invalid and evidence must be suppressed.	Gov’t: affidavits showed pen registers and other techniques were insufficient; not required to name Edwards for TT2 because unlikely his communications would be intercepted there.	Title III complied: omissions were not material; authorizing court did not abuse discretion in finding necessity; naming requirement not violated for TT2.
Was admission of Agent Bevington’s lay-opinion testimony permissible under FRE 701/702/704?	Williams: Bevington’s lay interpretations were based on investigatory expertise and unspecified bases, thus improperly presented as lay testimony and deprived jury of bases to assess opinions.	Gov’t: testimony rested on Agent’s perceptions and review of calls/surveillance; any error harmless given overall record.	Admission violated FRE 701 because bases were too general and risked expert-in-lay disguise; error was not harmless as to Williams — conviction reversed and remanded.
Did offering Bowman a "wired" plea (contingent on Williams pleading) violate due process?	Bowman: wired plea was coercive/bad-faith attempt to ensure joint conviction/trial.	Gov’t: wired plea is permissible; Gov’t had probable cause to prosecute both; no bad faith or coercion shown.	Wired plea permissible; no due-process violation under Pollard and related precedent.

Key Cases Cited

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (establishes entitlement to evidentiary hearing where affidavit contains knowingly false statements or material omissions)
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (interprets Title III "naming" requirement and limits on suppression for non-disclosure)
United States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978 (D.C. Cir.) (FRE 701: law-enforcement lay opinions must identify objective bases; vague bases are inadmissible)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (harmless-error standard; reversal required if error may have had substantial influence)
United States v. Bell, 795 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir.) (sentencing courts may consider acquitted or uncharged conduct by preponderance for sentencing)
United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.) (plea-wiring does not per se violate due process if prosecution has probable cause and acts in good faith)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (trial court’s gatekeeping role for expert reliability under FRE 702)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)