United States v. Henry Reddick
900 F.3d 636
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- Henry Reddick uploaded image files to Microsoft SkyDrive (cloud storage); SkyDrive uses PhotoDNA to hash and compare uploads to a database of known child‑pornography hashes.
- PhotoDNA flagged matches and Microsoft sent CyberTips (including the flagged files and uploader IP info) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).
- NCMEC forwarded CyberTips to Corpus Christi police; Detective Ilse opened the flagged files, visually confirmed child pornography, then obtained a warrant to search Reddick’s home and seized additional evidence.
- Reddick was indicted for possession of child pornography and moved to suppress evidence, arguing Detective Ilse’s warrantless review of the files was an unlawful search; the district court denied suppression on the good‑faith exception ground.
- The Fifth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Reddick had a privacy expectation in his files but concluded the private search doctrine controlled because Microsoft’s hash‑matching had already frustrated his privacy interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Detective Ilse’s warrantless viewing of files flagged by Microsoft violated the Fourth Amendment | Reddick: opening the files was a governmental search that violated his privacy and tainted subsequent evidence | Government: Microsoft’s private hash search frustrated Reddick’s expectation of privacy; police use of that information is not a separate Fourth Amendment search | The private search doctrine applies; no Fourth Amendment violation by Ilse’s viewing |
| Whether the government’s viewing expanded the private search sufficiently to be a new search | Reddick: visual review went beyond hash comparison and thus was a new search | Government: Ilse only confirmed what PhotoDNA had effectively identified; his review merely dispelled residual doubt | Held: viewing did not significantly expand the prior private search and was akin to confirmatory testing |
| Whether suppression is required for evidence seized after the file review | Reddick: later evidence should be suppressed as fruit of unconstitutional search | Government: no constitutional violation occurred; exclusion is unwarranted | Held: exclusion not required because no Fourth Amendment violation occurred under private search doctrine |
| Whether analysis is affected by lack of record about SkyDrive’s end‑user agreement | Reddick: terms of service might limit privacy expectations | Government: not determinative here because private search already frustrated expectation | Held: court assumed without deciding Reddick had an expectation of privacy but resolved case on private search doctrine regardless |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (establishes that a private party’s search that frustrates an expectation of privacy permits government use of the discovered information)
- Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (distinguishes when government action constitutes an independent search versus extension of private search)
- United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001) (private search doctrine focuses on whether privacy expectation was already frustrated)
- United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2013) (describes hash values and their use in identifying digital images)
- United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016) (contrasting case where government searched files whose hashes did not match known contraband)
- United States v. Larman, [citation="547 F. App'x 475"] (5th Cir.) (describes hash values as a unique digital fingerprint used to identify child pornography)