United States v. Henry Bams
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9735
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Officers stopped Bams twice: first in Nacogdoches County, TX, where police discovered five bags of cash ($253,341) in the trunk; county forfeited $100,000 and returned the remainder, later deposited into Bams’s account.
- Weeks later in Arkansas, Officer Pinner stopped the same vehicle for an unsafe lane change; observed nervousness, a single key, energy drinks, and an apparently tampered rear quarter panel; with consent he searched and found 10 kg of cocaine concealed in false compartments.
- Indicted on (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846) and (2) use of an interstate facility in aid of racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)); convicted by jury.
- Sentencing: PSR designated Bams a career offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1), yielding a guidelines range of 360 months to life; district court granted downward departure to 240 months (count 1) concurrent with 60 months (count 2).
- Bams appealed suppression denial, sufficiency of evidence for both counts, and several sentencing determinations (career-offender status, specific enhancements, and criminal-history points).
Issues
| Issue | Bams’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of Arkansas traffic stop (Terry first prong) | Pinner misinterpreted Arkansas “safely clear” statute; no reasonable suspicion | Pinner had objectively reasonable suspicion of statutory lane-change violation; officer’s statutory interpretation was reasonable | Stop justified: officer’s reasonable, objectively reasonable legal interpretation upheld (Heien framework applied) |
| Scope/duration of detention (Terry second prong / consent taint) | Detention was unreasonably prolonged before consent, tainting consent | Pinner developed reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking before computer checks ended (tampered panel, nervousness, single key, energy drinks) | No unlawful prolongation; consent voluntary and untainted |
| Sufficiency of evidence for drug conspiracy (§ 846) | Cash and conduct could be explained innocently (Mitchell’s settlement) | Cash format/denominations, multiple phones, text messages referencing prices, travel patterns, later seizure of 10 kg with same occupants supported conspiracy | Evidence sufficient; a rational jury could find agreement beyond reasonable doubt |
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 1952 count | Money was licit; no evidence of intent to further unlawful activity | Same circumstantial proof of drug conspiracy and transportation of money supported intent and act in furtherance | Evidence sufficient to support § 1952 conviction |
| Career-offender classification | Prior federal and state convictions arise from same conduct; federal conviction not an adult conviction due to certification statute | Prior convictions were counted separately under §4A1.2 (different instruments and different sentencing dates); federal conviction treated as adult because conspiracy extended past 18th birthday and collateral attack barred | Career-offender classification proper; collateral attack on prior conviction barred; district court’s finding supported by record |
| Alleged sentencing guideline errors (base level, leadership enhancement, supervised-release points) | Multiple guideline findings were erroneous | Even if errors occurred, career-offender status controls offense level and criminal-history category | Any such errors harmless because career-offender status determined the guideline range |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (established two-step Terry analysis for stops and seizures)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (standard of review for reasonable-suspicion and probable-cause determinations)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency-of-the-evidence review)
- Andres v. United States, 703 F.3d 828 (5th Cir. 2013) (two-step traffic-stop/Terry framework application)
- United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 1999) (unreasonable prolongation where detention continued after checks cleared)
- United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2006) (physical signs of vehicle modification support reasonable suspicion of concealment)
- Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (limits on collateral attack of prior convictions at sentencing)