United States v. Helena Tantillo
686 F. App'x 257
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Helena Tantillo, a former BearingPoint executive, was interviewed by the FBI during its investigation of a bribery conspiracy involving Dallas County Commissioner John Wiley Price; she was interviewed three times between 2013 and 2014.
- Tantillo made two statements to the FBI: (1) that BearingPoint gave consultant Christian Campbell a pay raise to fund a contribution to a commissioner’s favored charity (allegedly not Price); and (2) that a former boss reminded her of that reason during a phone call. She repeated these statements in a subsequent interview.
- Evidence at trial: Campbell testified he and Tantillo agreed $7,500 of his raise would go to consultant Kathy Nealy (who funneled benefits to Price); other BearingPoint employees contradicted Tantillo’s charitable-contribution story; phone records showed no call between Tantillo and her former boss when she said the reminder occurred.
- Tantillo was convicted on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) for making false statements, sentenced to six months’ imprisonment on each count (concurrent), fines, and supervised release, and appealed raising four challenges.
- On appeal she argued (1) erroneous exclusion of polygraph-related testimony, (2) an improper jury instruction defining materiality, (3) insufficient evidence to convict, and (4) double-jeopardy/multiplicity from convictions on two counts.
Issues
| Issue | Tantillo's Argument | Government/District Court's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of polygraph-willingness evidence | Testimony that she was willing to take a polygraph would corroborate her good-faith belief and credibility | Exclusion under Rule 403 was proper; such evidence was more prejudicial/misleading than probative | No reversible error: district court did not abuse discretion and exclusion would not have changed outcome |
| Jury instruction on materiality | Materiality requires influence on an “official decision” (e.g., whether to arrest/charge specific defendants) | §1001 materiality is broader: a statement is material if it has a natural tendency or capability to influence an FBI decision | No plain error: the pattern instruction was correct for §1001; Kungys’ narrow phrasing tied to different statute does not control |
| Sufficiency of the evidence | Statements were mistakes or faulty memory (no specific intent to deceive); some testimony could support her account | Jury heard contradicted testimony, phone records, Campbell’s admission he passed money to Nealy; jury may discredit Tantillo’s self-serving memory claim | Evidence sufficient on falsity, intent, materiality, and jurisdiction; convictions affirmed |
| Double jeopardy / multiplicity | Two statements arose from a single transaction and thus cannot support separate punishments | Each count required proof of distinct elements and separate false statements made at different interviews | No double jeopardy problem: two distinct offenses; separate punishments proper |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Delgado, 668 F.3d 219 (5th Cir.) (jury may choose among reasonable constructions of evidence)
- United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639 (5th Cir.) (jury has sole authority to weigh credibility)
- United States v. Abrahem, 678 F.3d 370 (5th Cir.) (elements of §1001(a)(2))
- Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988) (materiality analyzed in the context of a statute narrowly tied to an agency’s specific decision)
- United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428 (5th Cir.) (multiplicity/double-jeopardy test: separate punishable acts require separate convictions)