United States v. Helbrans
7:19-cr-00497
S.D.N.Y.Oct 12, 2021Background
- Defendants Nachman Helbrans and Mayer Rosner, members of Lev Tahor, are charged in superseding indictments with (inter alia) international parental kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1204), conspiracy to transport a minor for criminal sexual activity (18 U.S.C. § 2423), and related conspiracies arising from December 2018 (and an attempted March 2019) removal of two minors from their mother in New York to Mexico/Guatemala.
- A Kings County Family Court had granted the mother temporary sole custody in November 2018; the Government alleges defendants acted to obstruct that lawful exercise of parental rights by removing the minors abroad.
- Defendants, granted pro se status, filed voluminous motions and exhibits and asserted defenses including consent, religious/"celestial" marriage, rescue from abuse, and selective prosecution; they also complained of limited access to resources while detained.
- The Government moved in limine to admit (A) testimony about uncharged community practices (Rule 404(b)), (B) co-conspirator statements (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)) and statements against penal interest (Rule 804(b)(3)), and (C) business records via Rule 803(6)/902(11); it also sought to preclude certain defense arguments as irrelevant or prejudicial.
- The Court set pretrial deadlines for the October 18, 2021 trial of Helbrans and Rosner and resolved numerous in limine disputes preliminarily: it limited "other acts" evidence mainly to marriage/sexual practices involving minors, barred inflammatory characterizations (e.g., calling Lev Tahor a "cult" or "brainwashing"), conditionally admitted co-conspirator statements, permitted business-record certifications if Rule 902(11) notice met, and ruled on viability of statutory defenses under the IPKCA and Mann Act.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Position | Defendants' Position | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Use of labels "kidnapping/abduction" at trial | Necessary and permissible; reflects charged statutes and jury instructions | Terms are inflammatory and misleading because no force used | Court allowed use; common name for charged crime and required in jury instructions |
| Use of word "victim" for minors | Accurate and permissible; fair argument; CVRA supports term | Should be precluded as prejudicial | Court allowed the term; not unduly prejudicial given issues tried |
| Reference to Lev Tahor as a "cult" or "brainwashing" | Govt agreed not to use "cult"; may present evidence as needed | Defendants object to coerced/pejorative characterizations | Court prohibited referring to Lev Tahor as a "cult" or alleging "brainwashing" or similar incendiary labels |
| Admission of community "other acts" (404(b)) | Relevant as direct or inextricably intertwined re: arranged child marriages and sexual practices involving minors | Unduly prejudicial and insufficient notice | Admitted limited 404(b) evidence tied to arranging marriages/sexual activity with under-16s; barred unrelated abuse allegations and claims that leaders urged use of force |
| Co-conspirator statements (801(d)(2)(E)) and statements against interest (804(b)(3)) | Admissible conditionally if Government proves conspiracy membership and in-furtherance / if declarant unavailable and corroboration | Defendants contest availability and foundation for hearsay exceptions | Court conditionally admitted such statements subject to foundational proof at trial; discussed standards for in-furtherance and corroboration |
| Admission of defendants’ own filings/affidavits | Can be introduced as party-opponent admissions or against penal interest if foundation( and availability) met | Implicit consent or no objection where they voluntarily filed; but dispute over testimonial use | Court: admissible if proper foundation, relevant, and not unfairly prejudicial; warned pro se statements may be used against them |
| Business records / electronic evidence (803(6)/902(11)) | Seek admission via Rule 902(11) certifications with reasonable notice | Defendants may object to authenticity/foundation | Court preliminarily permitted authentication via 902(11) if notice adequate; encouraged stipulations to avoid custodial testimony |
| Resources for pro se defendants (Faretta-related) | No entitlement to state-funded law library beyond reasonable accommodations; court provided laptops, standby counsel, and accommodations | Defendants claimed inadequate access to legal materials and sought delay | Court held Faretta does not guarantee special state-funded resources; substantial accommodations already provided and pro se status stands |
| IPKCA defenses: consent/lack of force | IPKCA does not require force; consent of child irrelevant for 1204; domestic-violence defense limited | Defendants argued lack of force and minors’ consent negate kidnapping; marriage and religious practices preclude criminality | Court ruled lack of force and minors’ consent are not defenses under IPKCA; marital/religious "celestial" marriage not a legal defense absent a law-recognized marriage; domestic-violence defense confined to physical (including sexual) abuse and not broad emotional claims |
| Challenge to Family Court custody order / relitigating custody | Govt: Family Court order established lawful parental rights for IPKCA purposes; not subject to collateral attack here | Defendants sought to dispute order’s validity and underlying custody rulings | Court barred relitigation of the Family Court custody order; custody order governs parental rights for IPKCA analysis unless properly overturned in that forum |
| Selective prosecution / religious discrimination claim | Government: no evidence of discriminatory effect or intent; prosecution proper | Defendants alleged prosecution motivated by religion and historic persecution | Court found no sufficient evidence to pursue selective-prosecution claim; precluded raising it to the jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se but not entitlement to specific state-funded legal resources)
- United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (standard for selective-prosecution claim: must show discriminatory effect and intent)
- Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (preponderance standard for proving conspiracy predicates to admit co-conspirator hearsay)
- United States v. Houtar, 980 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2020) (elements of IPKCA and interpretation applied in this Circuit)
- United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2010) (custody/court order governs parental rights for IPKCA purposes)
- United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing availability of Hague-convention-derived defenses under IPKCA)
- Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (limits on admission of non-self-inculpatory statements as statements against penal interest)
- United States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538 (9th Cir. 1996) (prosecutorial latitude to use common names of crimes in argument)
- United States v. Hsu, 669 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2012) (Rule 404(b) and the inclusionary approach to other-act evidence)