United States v. Heineman
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17704
| 10th Cir. | 2014Background
- Aaron Heineman sent three emails to a University of Utah professor; the third contained violent, racially charged language that caused the professor to fear for his safety and family's safety.
- Law enforcement traced the email to Heineman; he acknowledged the email when contacted and was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (interstate threats).
- Heineman moved for a jury instruction requiring proof that he intended the recipient to feel threatened and argued § 875(c) was facially unconstitutional without such a requirement; the district court denied relief and convicted after a stipulated-facts bench trial, finding the communication would cause a reasonable person to conclude the sender intended to cause bodily injury but not expressly finding Heineman intended to instill fear.
- On appeal Heineman argued the conviction violated the First Amendment because the court did not find subjective intent to cause fear; the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether § 875(c) requires proof that the speaker intended the recipient to feel threatened.
- The panel concluded Virginia v. Black requires a subjective intent-to-threaten element for “true threats,” reversed Heineman’s conviction, and remanded for the district court to determine whether he intended his email to be threatening.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 875(c) requires proof that defendant intended the recipient to feel threatened | Gov: statute criminalizes communications that a reasonable person would view as threats; no additional subjective intent required | Heineman: Constitution requires proof that speaker intended to place victim in fear (he cites Black); his Asperger’s affects intent | Court: First Amendment (as interpreted in Black) requires subjective intent to instill fear; reversed and remanded |
| Whether Black controls true-threat mens rea | Gov: Black did not impose a new subjective standard applicable to § 875(c); other circuits read it objectively | Heineman: Black’s language (and plurality overbreadth analysis) shows intent-to-fear is required | Court: Read Black to require that true threats be made with intent to instill fear; plurality and multiple opinions support that reading |
| Whether Tenth Circuit precedent forecloses subjective-intent reading | Gov: prior Tenth Circuit cases adopt objective test (Viefhaus, Dysart) | Heineman: those precedents predate or don’t bind on Black’s question | Court: Circuit precedent not binding if inconsistent with Supreme Court; Black controls; subjective intent required |
| Whether the proper resolution should avoid constitutional question via statutory construction | Concurring view: apply statutory interpretation/avoid constitutional question; § 875(c) can be read to include subjective intent without invoking First Amendment | Majority: directly applies First Amendment/Black to read in required scienter | Result: Majority decides on First Amendment grounds; concurrence would have resolved statutory construction first |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (defines “true threats” and discusses intent to place victim in fear)
- United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999) (Tenth Circuit discussion of "true threat" standard in bomb-threat context)
- United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1983) (interpretation of "threat" in § 871 prosecution against the President)
- United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2013) (relevant Third Circuit treatment of mens rea for § 875(c); later granted certiorari)
- United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ninth Circuit reading of Black as requiring subjective intent)