United States v. Heicklen, 858 F. Supp. 2d 256

On November 18, 2010, a grand jury indicted Julian Heicklen for attempting to influence the actions or decisions of a juror under 18 U.S.C. § 1504.
Alleged conduct spanned October 2009 through May 2010 outside the SDNY Courthouse, where Heicklen distributed FIJA pamphlets urging jury nullification.
Heicklen elected to represent himself with stand-by counsel appointed to assist him.
Heicklen moved to dismiss the Indictment as legally insufficient, and argued it was duplicitous, overbroad under the First Amendment, and vague under the Fifth Amendment; he also sought a jury trial and a bill of particulars.
The Indictment states Heicklen distributed pamphlets immediately in front of the Courthouse entrance in New York, advocating jury nullification.
The court relied on the Indictment and held that § 1504 requires a written communication relating to a specific case or point in dispute before a juror or pertaining to the juror’s duties, and found the Indictment insufficient to allege all elements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the Indictment under § 1504	Heicklen argues the Indictment fails to allege all elements of the crime.	Government contends the Indictment pleads the required elements and the facts provide a basis for liability.	Indictment dismissed as legally insufficient.
Scope of § 1504: issue/matter vs. duties	Broad construction would cover general speech to jurors.	Statute should be read narrowly to require relation to a specific case or point in dispute or juror duties.	Court adopts narrow construction: prohibited written communication must relate to a specific case or point before the juror.
First Amendment overbreadth concerns	Statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and chills protected speech about judicial proceedings.	Narrow construction limits chilling effects and preserves protected discussion about the judiciary.	Court acknowledges First Amendment concerns and construes statute narrowly; ultimately, Indictment dismissed on other grounds.
Duplicity and vagueness	Indictment trafficking multiple potential liabilities in a single count.	The Government argues the count is properly framed with respect to the statute.	Court finds no need to determine duplicity post-dismissal; statute interpreted to require relation to a specific case or point.

LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165 (2d Cir.2002) (indictment must allege sufficient facts or be read to include implied facts)
United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.2012) (statutory interpretation and ambiguity in criminal statutes)
Crowley, 236 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.2000) (pretrial dismissal when indictment fails to state an offense as a matter of law)
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (clear and present danger standard for restricting speech about judicial proceedings)
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (First Amendment limits on punishment for speech outside official proceedings)
Turney v. Pugh, 400 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir.2005) (speech to jurors outside proceedings not protected when aimed at influencing outcome of a specific case)