United States v. Hector Uriarte, 975 F.3d 596

Hector Uriarte, a gang member, was convicted of racketeering, drug offenses, and two counts of using a firearm in a kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
At his 2013 sentencing the district court applied a 7‑year brandishing enhancement to the first § 924(c) count and a 25‑year mandatory minimum to the second § 924(c) count, producing a 50‑year term.
This Court vacated Uriarte’s sentence in United States v. Cardena based on an Alleyne error (brandishing is a jury-found element) and remanded for resentencing.
While Uriarte awaited resentencing, Congress enacted the First Step Act § 403, which narrows when consecutive § 924(c) convictions trigger the 25‑year mandatory minimum and states it applies to offenses committed before enactment "if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment."
On remand the district court applied § 403, recalculated mandatory minima (two § 924(c) counts each at 5 years absent brandishing) and sentenced Uriarte to 25 years less (total 20 years); the Government appealed.
The Seventh Circuit majority affirmed, holding that a vacated sentence leaves the defendant without a sentence on the Act’s effective date and thus § 403(b) applies; a dissent argued the statute looks to whether a sentence had ever been imposed (historical act) and would exclude Uriarte.

Issue	Uriarte's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether First Step Act §403(b) applies when a prior sentence was vacated before enactment and resentencing remained pending	§403(b) applies because on the Act’s effective date Uriarte had no legally binding sentence (vacatur left a “clean slate”)	§403(b) does not apply because a sentence had been imposed earlier; vacatur does not erase the historical fact that sentencing occurred before enactment	Majority: §403(b) applies; vacatur leaves no sentence on enactment date and Act’s remedial purpose supports application. Dissent: statute refers to historical imposition, so Act does not apply
Meaning of “a sentence … has not been imposed” — present legal status vs. past imposition	Read as present condition: no effective sentence on enactment date = eligible for Act	Read as past act: whether a sentencing was ever imposed (even if later vacated) controls and excludes Uriarte	Majority adopts present-status reading (vacatur = no sentence for §403(b) purposes); dissent prefers historical-act reading (imposition in past controls)

United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2016) (vacated Uriarte’s sentence for Alleyne error and remanded for resentencing)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (holding brandishing is an element of § 924(c) requiring jury finding)
Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (discussing default rule on retroactivity of sentencing reforms and Congress’s ability to alter applicability)
United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2019) (treated a sentence as ‘imposed’ when the district court pronounced it, regardless of later appeals)
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (vacatur ‘‘wipes the slate clean’’ for purposes of resentencing)
United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (distinguished limited remand and read §403 in light of prior sentence imposition)