United States v. Hector Parrales-Guzman
922 F.3d 706
5th Cir.2019Background
- In 2001 an immigration judge ordered Hector Parrales-Guzman removed based on a Texas felony DWI the IJ treated as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) because it qualified as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
- Parrales-Guzman waived his right to appeal the 2001 removal to the BIA and did not move to reopen or raise the § 16(b) vagueness issue administratively.
- After returning unlawfully to the U.S., Parrales-Guzman was removed in 2010 and 2011 and indicted in 2014 for illegal reentry after felony conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
- He moved to dismiss the § 1326 indictment, arguing the 2001 removal was invalid because § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague; the government argued § 1326(d) bars collateral attack and that § 16(b) is not vague.
- The district court denied the motion under then-controlling Fifth Circuit precedent and convicted him; this court initially affirmed but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Dimaya.
- On remand this court held Parrales-Guzman failed the exhaustion prong of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) because he did not pursue administrative remedies (appeal or motion to reopen), and therefore his collateral attack is barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2001 removal order may be collaterally attacked in a § 1326 proceeding because § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague | Parrales-Guzman: § 16(b) is void for vagueness, so the removal order was void ab initio and § 1326(d) cannot bar collateral attack | Government: § 1326(d) requires exhaustion; Parrales-Guzman waived appeal and did not seek reopening, so collateral attack is barred | Held: Collateral attack barred — petitioner failed § 1326(d) exhaustion requirement; argument that vagueness voids order does not excuse failure to exhaust |
| Whether petitioner exhausted administrative remedies available to challenge the removal | Parrales-Guzman: contends constitutional invalidity defeats exhaustion requirement | Government: petitioner waived appeal and did not move to reopen; remedies were available | Held: No exhaustion — petitioner waived appeal and did not pursue reopening, so § 1326(d) first prong fails |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (recognizes limited collateral attack on removal orders in § 1326 prosecutions when administrative/judicial review is unavailable)
- United States v. Mendoza-Mata, 322 F.3d 829 (5th Cir. 2003) (if a § 1326(d) prong fails, court need not address the others)
- Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2009) (explains exhaustion occurs by raising claim on direct appeal or in a motion to reopen; remedy is available if BIA can address it)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (held 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague; prompted remand for cases decided under prior circuit precedent)