United States v. Hector Galvez Quebedo
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8911
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- Galvez pleaded guilty under a Fast-Track plea agreement to illegal reentry after an aggravated-felony conviction (8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2)) and waived appeal rights in the plea agreement.
- The plea agreement included a factual stipulation stating Galvez was "sentenced to 365 days in jail" for a 2006 California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, but contained no details about whether the sentence was suspended, probation imposed, or a misdemeanor declaration entered.
- The probation office's PSR applied a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (prior felony that is a crime of violence) after discovering Galvez's probation was later revoked and he was sentenced to three years in state prison in 2012.
- Galvez objected, arguing the 365-day term made the 2006 disposition a misdemeanor for § 2L1.2 purposes and that the government breached the plea agreement by introducing evidence contradicting the stipulation.
- The government introduced California court records showing a suspended imposition of sentence with probation and a later revocation that resulted in a three-year prison term; it argued these facts show the conviction was a felony for § 2L1.2 purposes.
- The district court overruled Galvez's objection, applied the 16-level enhancement, granted the government’s 2-level Fast-Track departure, and sentenced Galvez to 37 months. The Eighth Circuit held the government did not breach the plea agreement and dismissed the appeal under the waiver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Galvez) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether government breached plea agreement by introducing evidence/arguing prior offense was a felony crime of violence | Government’s evidence contradicted the stipulation that Galvez was "sentenced to 365 days in jail," so it breached the agreement and the appeal waiver is unenforceable | Plea did not bar the government from seeking enhancements not expressly stipulated; the evidence explained — not contradicted — the stipulation | No breach; government permitted to present evidence for enhancement; appeal waiver enforceable |
| Whether § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) 16-level enhancement applies to Galvez’s 2006 conviction | 365-day sentence made the conviction a misdemeanor under § 17(b) and guideline comment 2, so enhancement inapplicable | Under California law a wobbler is treated as a felony until judgment; suspended imposition + probation did not render it a misdemeanor and later revocation produced a >1 year judgment | Enhancement applies: conviction is a felony for § 2L1.2 purposes because judgment after revocation imposed >1 year |
| Whether the plea agreement’s factual stipulation precluded presenting records about probation suspension and revocation | Stipulation foreclosed evidence that would show felony-level punishment | Stipulation lacked the specific facts necessary to determine felony/misdemeanor status; records supplemented the stipulation | Stipulation did not bar the government from introducing court records that shed light on the disposition |
| Whether appeal waiver survives when government seeks enhancement at sentencing | Waiver unenforceable if government breaches plea agreement | Waiver stands absent a government breach; government did not breach here | Waiver valid; appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Noriega v. United States, 760 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2014) (plea-agreement interpretation; government may present evidence for issues not stipulated)
- Fowler v. United States, 445 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2006) (government breached when it advocated for a higher offense level contrary to an explicit stipulation)
- E.V. v. United States, 500 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2007) (introduction of evidence contrary to a specific stipulation amounts to breach)
- Adams v. United States, 716 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013) (California § 245 is a wobbler; treatment under § 17(b) analyzed)
- United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1992) (wobbler offenses treated as felonies until judgment; distinction between suspended imposition and imposed sentence explained)