United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369

Background

Andre Haymond was convicted by a jury of possession of child pornography and sentenced to 38 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release.
While on supervised release, government discovered images on his devices; a judge held a revocation hearing (no jury) and found by a preponderance that Haymond knowingly possessed 13 images.
Under 18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(3) the judge could have imposed up to 2 additional years, but §3583(k) (a separate provision) mandated a minimum 5-year term if the violation involved specified offenses (including child pornography).
The district judge imposed the 5‑year mandatory minimum under §3583(k) but expressed concern about imposing a new mandatory term based on judge-found facts by a preponderance standard.
The Tenth Circuit held §3583(k)’s 5‑year mandatory minimum violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (jury trial/right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt) and vacated the revocation sentence; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court (plurality) vacated the Tenth Circuit judgment and remanded, holding that applying §3583(k) in Haymond’s case violated the Sixth and Fifth Amendments because the judge‑found facts increased the legally prescribed minimum sentence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (United States)	Defendant's Argument (Haymond)	Held
Whether §3583(k)’s 5‑year mandatory minimum, triggered by judge‑found facts at a supervised‑release revocation, violates the Sixth Amendment jury‑trial right	Supervised‑release revocations are postjudgment administrative proceedings not governed by the jury right; alternative remedy is empaneling a jury if needed	A judge’s finding by a preponderance that triggers §3583(k) raises the mandatory minimum and therefore requires jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt under Apprendi/Alleyne	Held: Applying §3583(k) in this case violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because judge‑found facts increased the mandatory minimum sentence (plurality)
Whether supervised‑release revocation is part of the original criminal prosecution such that Apprendi/Alleyne apply	§3583(k) punishment is part of the original sentence and should not be relabeled to avoid jury protections; supervised‑release penalties can be part of the final sentence	Supervised‑release revocation is not part of the criminal prosecution; it is an administrative postjudgment proceeding analogous to parole revocation	Held: The Court treated the revocation punishment as part of the sentence for the original offense and therefore subject to Alleyne’s rule when it raises a new mandatory minimum
Whether historical parole/probation practice permits judge‑found facts and preponderance standard to trigger additional mandatory terms	Analogies to parole/probation justify lessened procedural protections; supervised release mirrors historic practices	§3583(k) differs critically: it imposes an additional mandatory floor beyond what the jury’s verdict authorized, unlike traditional parole/probation	Held: The Court rejected the government’s parity argument because §3583(k) authorizes a new mandatory minimum beyond the jury‑authorized range
Appropriate remedy when §3583(k) is unconstitutional as applied	Government: cure by jury fact‑finding on remand rather than invalidating statutory text	Haymond: the Tenth Circuit’s invalidation of the 5‑year sentences was appropriate	Held: Court vacated judgment and remanded for the court of appeals to consider remedy (declined to resolve whether empaneling a jury would suffice)

Key Cases Cited

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase prescribed punishment beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt)
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (Apprendi principle applies equally to facts that increase mandatory minimums)
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt every fact that the law makes essential to punishment)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (supervised‑release penalties are part of the penalty for the initial offense)
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation is not part of a criminal prosecution and requires limited due‑process protections)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation is not a stage of criminal prosecution; limited procedural protections apply)
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (prior case permitting judge‑found facts to affect certain sentencing minima, later limited by Alleyne)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (capital sentencing factors that increase punishment must be found by a jury)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (mandatory sentencing guidelines unconstitutional as applied; context for jury/sentencing limits)
Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343 (2012) (judicial factfinding cannot increase a criminal penalty beyond what the jury found)