United States v. Hayes, 2012 CAAF LEXIS 159

Appellee, a Naval Academy midshipman, stole laboratory equipment from Rickover Hall and sold it on eBay on ten occasions between Oct 2008 and Feb 2009.
Total proceeds were about $13,000; acts spanned five months, with equipment located in a university lab.
During plea colloquy, Appellee repeatedly stated no one forced the conduct and that he had no justification.
In unsworn pre-sentence statement, Appellee described pressure from his mother, including alleged threats of self-harm, and financial distress; his mother later provided a letter corroborating her coercive calls.
Military judge did not reopen providence inquiry after the unsworn statement and did not ask counsel about potential defenses.
NMCCA vacated findings and sentence, remanding for rehearing, under the view that the unsworn statement raised a possible duress defense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Threshold for further inquiry into a possible defense	Government seeks prima facie threshold	Appellee did not advocate a threshold change	Possible defense threshold controls; prima facie not required
Whether unsworn sentencing statement raised a possible duress defense	Appellee's statement set up inconsistent matter with plea	NMCCA correctly found possible defense	NMCCA erred in treating the statement as raising a defense under the wrong standard
Whether suicide threat can establish a duress defense	Government contends suicide threat cannot be duress as a matter of law	Appellee's position would allow such a defense in appropriate facts	Not foreclosed; suicide threat could provide basis for duress in an appropriate case

Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (abuse-of-discretion and de novo review of guilty-plea issues)
Phillippe, 63 M.J. 307 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (requirement to inquire where plea raises matter inconsistent with plea)
Resch, 65 M.J. 233 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (duress/absence defense where not all elements shown)
Olinger, 50 M.J. 365 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (vague speculation insufficient for duress applicability)
Logan, 22 C.M.A. 349 (C.M.A. 1973) (mitigation statements of threats do not raise duress absent immediacy)
Washington, 57 M.J. 394 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (duress guidance viewed with civilian-law principles and third-party threat concept)
Rankins, 34 M.J. 326 (C.M.A. 1992) (threats not necessarily limited to third-party coercion)
Jeffers, 57 M.J. 13 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (discussion of duress in the context of orders and coercion)
Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2006) (necessity/duress framework allowing coercion-based defense where fair)
Toney, 27 F.3d 1245 (7th Cir. 1994) (three-element coercion including immediate threat and no escape)
Santos, 932 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1991) (duress includes immediate threat and no reasonable escape)
Tanner, 941 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1991) (three-element coercion standard for duress)
Scott, 901 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1990) (coercion requires immediate threat and lack of escape)
Charmley, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1985) (duress elements: immediate threat, well-grounded fear, no escape)