United States v. Hawley
812 F. Supp. 2d 949
N.D. Iowa2011Background
- Hawley moved for partial summary judgment arguing FER A amendments to the False Claims Act do not apply retroactively and violate Ex Post Facto and Due Process.
- The United States alleges Hawley submitted false crop insurance applications and acreage information to NCCI for MPCI policies, causing indemnities and subsidies to be paid.
- Earlier rulings found Hawley’s conduct related to 2000 and 2001 applications; Hawley II recognized potential issues this case might raise, and the Eighth Circuit reversed on Counts 2–4, returning genuine issues of material fact.
- FERA amended § 3729 to clarify liability for false records, with § 4(f) making the amendments apply to claims pending on or after June 7, 2008 and § 2(b) defining 'claim'.
- The court adopts the view that the amendments apply to 'claims' (demands for money) rather than 'cases', and Hawley had no pending 'claim' after June 7, 2008, so the pre-FERA FCA governs.
- Consequently, the court grants Hawley partial summary judgment, and finds retroactive application would violate Ex Post Facto.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the FER A amendments retroactive to Hawley's conduct? | Government argues amendments apply to all 'claims' pending on/after 6/7/2008. | Hawley contends no 'claim' was pending after 6/7/2008; pre-FERA FCA should apply. | FERA amendments not retroactive; pre-FERA FCA applies. |
| Does retroactive application violate Ex Post Facto? | FER A amendments seek civil remedies for fraud; not punitive, so no Ex Post Facto issue. | Retroactive civil penalties under a punitive framework violate Ex Post Facto. | Retroactive application violates Ex Post Facto; the amendments cannot be applied. |
| Is the 'claim' definition in FERA broad enough to include a 'case'? | Definition extended to cover claims against the government, reducing ambiguity. | Definition pertains to money demands, not legal actions or cases. | Plain reading limits to 'claims', not cases; not retroactive to Hawley's circumstances. |
| Should Due Process require applying pre-FERA FCA given retroactivity concerns? | Due Process satisfied if retroactive application serves a legitimate objective. | Due Process would be violated if retroactivity imposed punishment for pre-existing acts. | Court declines reaching Due Process analysis since Ex Post Facto controls outcome. |
Key Cases Cited
- Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008) (copas: FCA claims under all subsections require intent; seminal for civil vs. punitive reading)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (seven-factor test for whether a civil statute is punitive)
- Ward v. United States, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (determines civil vs. criminal labeling of statutes in Ex Post Facto analysis)
- Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (federal penalties have deterrent effect; supports civil nature finding in some contexts)
- One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (factors for Ex Post Facto analysis; labeling of civil vs. criminal)
- Mason v. Medline Ind., Inc., N.D. Ill. 2010 (2010) (example recognizing retroactivity debates in FCA context)
- Burroughs v. Central Ark. Development Council, 2010 WL 1542532 (D. Kan. 2010) (interprets FERA §4(f) retroactivity and the definition of 'claim')