922 F.3d 129
2d Cir.2019Background
- Defendant Adnan Hausa, an al-Qaeda member, attacked U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan; one ambush killed two U.S. soldiers. He was arrested in Italy in 2011 and extradited to the Eastern District of New York.
- Hausa sought to represent himself; the district court conducted multiple Faretta colloquies but Hausa repeatedly refused to answer questions, interrupted, cursed, hummed, threatened the judge, demanded an "international court," and was repeatedly removed from proceedings.
- Three psychiatric evaluations found Hausa competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel, but he refused to engage in the colloquies required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.
- The district court denied Hausa's requests to proceed pro se (also citing his obstructionist conduct), tried him with counsel, and a jury convicted him on five counts including conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals (18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(2)); he received principally life imprisonment.
- On appeal Hausa argued: (1) the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation by denying his Faretta requests; and (2) Count One (§ 2332(b)(2)) requires killings within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States and thus did not cover the Afghanistan killings.
Issues
| Issue | Hausa's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court denied Hausa a valid Faretta waiver by refusing to let him proceed pro se | Hausa argued his waiver was "knowing and intelligent" and the court erred in denying self-representation | The court could not find a knowing, intelligent waiver because Hausa refused to engage in colloquy and blocked the court from assessing his understanding | Affirmed: waiver invalidly shown because defendant prevented the required colloquy; denial proper |
| Whether the court could deny pro se status based on obstructionist misconduct | Hausa contended that once warned of risks, he was entitled to proceed pro se | Court may deny self-representation when defendant deliberately disrupts, refuses courtroom protocol, or cannot abide rules | Affirmed: independent basis to deny Faretta—egregious, repeated obstruction justified denial |
| Whether § 2332(b)(2) requires the murder to occur within U.S. special maritime/territorial jurisdiction | Hausa argued incorporation of § 1111 made subsection (2) domestic, so conviction for killings in Afghanistan was improper | § 2332(b)(2) criminalizes conspiracies to kill U.S. nationals outside the United States; § 1111(b) (jurisdictional aggravator) is irrelevant to (b)(2) | Affirmed: § 2332(b)(2) applies extraterritorially to conspiracies to kill U.S. nationals abroad |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and requirement that waiver be knowing and intelligent)
- Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 1998) (district court must ensure waiver is knowing and intelligent via on-the-record discussion)
- United States v. Spencer, 995 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1993) (standard of review for waiver-of-counsel findings)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (denial of right to counsel not subject to harmless-error review)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on standby counsel when defendant proceeds pro se)
- United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011) (§ 2332(b) applies extraterritorially)
- United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1999) (waiver inquiry depends on facts and defendant characteristics)
- United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997) (trial court must be persuaded waiver is rational and defendant has capacity to understand consequences)
- Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2008) (court may deny pro se status for serious obstruction or inability to follow courtroom protocol)
- Davis v. Grant, 532 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (willingness and ability to abide by courtroom protocol can be prerequisite to accepting waiver)
- United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008) (court may accept less-than-full colloquy if it is satisfied defendant understands choices and dangers)
