United States v. Harris, 838 F.3d 98

Troy Harris was convicted in 2001 of narcotics conspiracy and was serving five years of supervised release beginning March 18, 2011.
July 25, 2014: a woman complained Harris struck her (third-degree assault); the state case was later dismissed when she declined to press charges and Probation recommended no federal action.
September 2, 2014: NYPD arrested Harris for third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance; Probation recommended and the court ordered a modification—adding a search condition—on September 15, 2014.
November 14, 2014: Probation alleged additional violations (failure to notify change of residence; failure to answer truthfully) and filed a revocation petition charging assault and narcotics distribution; revocation was later pursued after evidence was developed.
April 2, 2015: at the revocation hearing, the district court admitted the assault victim’s out-of-court statements under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) on a showing of fear and reliability, found by a preponderance (indeed, overwhelming) that Harris committed both the narcotics offense and the assault while on supervision, and revoked supervised release, imposing 27 months’ imprisonment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) permits revocation based on conduct that previously prompted modification of supervised-release conditions	Government: § 3583(e) permits district courts to take modification and revocation actions; revocation is proper when proof meets § 3583(e)(3) and mandates of § 3583(g)(1) apply.	Harris: The disjunctive "or" in § 3583(e) means modification and revocation are mutually exclusive; once court modified conditions for particular conduct, it cannot later revoke for that same conduct.	Court: Rejected Harris. § 3583(e) does not preclude revocation after modification; the statutory scheme distinguishes the actions by different procedures and burdens, and revocation is permissible and sometimes mandated (e.g., § 3583(g)(1)).
Whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the assault victim’s hearsay statements under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C)	Government: Good cause existed—victim feared retaliation and her statements were reliable (911 call, consistent accounts, observing officer’s injuries).	Harris: Admitting the hearsay denied confrontation; the victim’s fear was speculative and her statements unreliable (e.g., alcohol use).	Court: No abuse of discretion. The district court reasonably balanced Harris’s confrontation interest against the victim’s fear and demonstrated reliability, so admission under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) was proper.

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (disjunctive "or" canon and statutory interpretation)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (recognizing a court may both modify/extend and later revoke under § 3583(e))
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (confrontation and procedural protections in revocation proceedings)
United States v. Carthen, 681 F.3d 94 (interest-of-justice balancing under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C))
Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (treatment of disjunctive statutory language)
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (statutory context and giving effect to all provisions)
Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156 (caution about mechanically applying disjunctive canon)