United States v. Harris
205 F.Supp.3d 651
M.D. Penn.2016Background
- Delmar Harris pled guilty in 2006 to being a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); PSR relied on multiple prior Pennsylvania convictions to apply the ACCA and impose a mandatory 15‑year sentence (180 months).
- Harris did not appeal his 2006 sentence; after Johnson v. United States (2015) struck down the ACCA residual clause, he filed a timely 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion arguing his ACCA enhancement no longer applies.
- Potential predicate convictions in the PSR: burglary (1987), robbery (1987, 1990), aggravated assault (1987, 1995), resisting arrest (1995), escape (1995), and a qualifying drug offense.
- With the residual clause invalidated, the court analyzed each prior conviction under the categorical/modified‑categorical approaches to determine whether they remain ACCA "violent felonies" via the elements clause or enumerated‑offenses clause.
- The court excused procedural default (found cause and prejudice) and reached the merits, finding that several convictions do not categorically qualify as violent felonies but gave the government leave to produce Shepard documents for certain offenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harris) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural default of Johnson claim | Default excused because vagueness challenge not reasonably available at sentencing; claim is novel | Claim could have been raised on direct appeal; therefore defaulted | Court found Harris showed cause and prejudice and excused default, so merits considered |
| Whether 1995 escape conviction is a violent felony | Escape does not categorically have force as an element and thus is not a violent felony | Statute divisible; subsection involving employment of force could qualify; PSR suggests physical struggle | Court: record does not show the force‑based subsection; escape does not qualify absent Shepard documents; government given chance to produce them |
| Whether 1995 resisting arrest conviction is a violent felony | Statute can be violated by passive conduct or conduct that only triggers officer force; thus it lacks defendant's use‑of‑force element and is not a violent felony | Government contends officer's required substantial force establishes the necessary element; Shepard documents may show violent conduct | Court: elements clause requires defendant's use/attempt/threat of physical force; Pennsylvania statute (including passive conduct) does not categorically require that; resisting arrest is not a violent felony |
| Whether burglary, aggravated assault, and robbery convictions qualify | Harris: Pennsylvania burglary is overbroad and indivisible (includes vehicles/businesses); certain robbery and aggravated assault subsections permit non‑force or reckless/omission conduct, so they don't categorically meet the elements clause | Government: some subsections clearly involve force (aggravated assault subsections, robbery subsections); requests Shepard documents to show which subsection applied | Court: Pennsylvania burglary is indivisible and broader than generic burglary — not a predicate; aggravated assault subsection(s) that permit omission or recklessness do not categorically qualify, though some subsections could; robbery has qualifying subsections but also a subsection (thief "by force however slight") and a subsection referencing other felonies that can be non‑violent; court found only one predicate (the drug offense) clearly remains and gave government leave to submit Shepard documents to prove any two additional predicates |
Key Cases Cited
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (procedural default: cause and prejudice standard for collateral review)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2552 (2015) (struck down ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limits on using the modified categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility analysis for statutes with alternative means/elements)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (causing bodily injury necessarily involves use of physical force for statutes with knowing/intentional mens rea)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (definition of generic burglary for ACCA purposes)