United States v. Harrington
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3831
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Harrington was convicted by a jury on seven federal drug counts and had court‑appointed counsel at trial.
- He twice sought replacement of appointed counsel post‑trial, leading the court to discharge the first attorney and appoint a second (Loeffel).
- Concerns arose about Harrington’s mental state; a competency evaluation found no mental illness and that Harrington was malingering; the court found him competent.
- Shortly before sentencing Harrington insisted on proceeding pro se; the court initially resisted but after colloquy permitted him to waive counsel and represent himself at sentencing.
- At sentencing Harrington requested counsel again; the court treated his prior conduct as a waiver and a likely delay tactic and denied reinstatement of counsel.
- Harrington was sentenced to 360 months; he appealed asserting he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel for sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Harrington validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel for sentencing | Harrington: court did not conduct a formal Faretta‑style inquiry and failed to ensure he understood charges, penalties, and disadvantages of self‑representation | Government/District Court: waiver occurred post‑trial where full trial‑stage colloquy is not required; Harrington understood sentencing issues, had discussed PSR, and received warnings | Court: Waiver was knowing and intelligent given post‑trial timing, prior experience, warnings from judge, and strategic/delay context; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ( Sixth Amendment permits waiver of counsel and self‑representation when knowing and intelligent)
- Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (trial‑stage waiver inquiry requirements; post‑trial waivers need not be as elaborate)
- United States v. Alden, 527 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2008) (factors to assess knowing intelligent waiver)
- United States v. Todd, 424 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2005) (same; context and experience relevant)
- United States v. Sandles, 23 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1994) (evidence of manipulation/delay supports finding of waiver)
- United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003) (prior convictions and courtroom familiarity inform waiver voluntariness)
- United States v. Volpentesta, 727 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2013) (strategic reasons for waiving counsel indicate a knowing decision)