United States v. Harold Bolman, 956 F.3d 583

On July 25, 2016, Harold Bolman, visibly intoxicated (BAC .205), backed his Dodge Ram pickup over his nephew William White Eagle, who died of mechanical asphyxiation; no eyewitness saw the impact.
Multiple witnesses found Bolman at the scene (engine running) and others testified Bolman had been drinking heavily that day; Bolman admitted he had been drinking and had "backed up and ran over" his nephew.
A federal grand jury indicted Bolman for involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (and § 1153 jurisdictional provision); a jury convicted him and the district court sentenced him to 51 months' imprisonment and restitution.
On appeal Bolman raised two main challenges: (1) insufficiency of the evidence to prove gross negligence required for involuntary manslaughter; and (2) plain error in jury instructions for failing to treat "actual knowledge" as a separate element.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed sufficiency de novo and instructional error for plain error and affirmed the conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency: whether evidence proved gross negligence for § 1112	Government: evidence of high intoxication (.205 BAC), Bolman’s admissions he knew he was too drunk, he nonetheless drove a large pickup on a residential street and did not use his backup camera — supports gross negligence beyond a reasonable doubt.	Bolman: DUI alone (a strict-liability offense in ND) is insufficient to prove gross negligence; lack of accident reconstruction means no proof of how he struck the victim (speed, distance, position).	Affirmed. Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could find gross negligence based on intoxication, awareness of danger, roadway context, and failure to use safety equipment.
Jury instruction: whether the court plainly erred by not instructing "actual knowledge" as a separate element	Government: the instructions, read as a whole, required proof of knowledge because the definition of gross negligence incorporated knowledge language consistent with Eighth Circuit precedent.	Bolman: the court folded "actual knowledge" into the gross-negligence definition and never separately instructed that knowledge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.	Affirmed. No plain error — the instructions tracked circuit precedent and, taken together, adequately explained the elements and the government's burden.

United States v. Opsta, 659 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1981) (articulates gross-negligence/knowledge formulation for § 1112).
United States v. Schmidt, 626 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1980) (adopts Ninth Circuit reasoning on gross negligence and knowledge).
United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1979) (frames § 1112 as requiring gross negligence plus actual knowledge of danger).
United States v. Fast Horse, 747 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 2014) (jury-instruction review standard; instructions judged as a whole).
United States v. Parker, 871 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard for de novo sufficiency review).