United States v. Harmon
742 F.3d 451
10th Cir.2014Background
- Officer Lucero observed Harmon weaving within his lane and at one point the front and rear passenger tires crossed the fog (right shoulder) line while patrolling I-40 in eastern New Mexico. No adverse weather or traffic conditions were present.
- Lucero did not stop immediately because both cars entered a construction zone; he followed about 2.5 miles, then initiated a stop. The minute of in-dash video before the stop did not show weaving.
- At the stop Lucero noticed a strong air-freshener odor, asked about fatigue/drinking (no field sobriety tests given), issued a written warning for failing to maintain a lane, and told Harmon he was free to go.
- Lucero asked Harmon to return for further questioning; Harmon consented to a vehicle search. Narcotics (marijuana and cocaine) were found concealed in the spare tire; Harmon was charged with possession with intent to distribute.
- Harmon moved to suppress; the district court found Lucero credible, denied suppression and later denied Harmon’s motion to reopen based on alleged impeachment material from an unrelated stop. Harmon appealed; this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Harmon's Argument | Government/Officer's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reasonable suspicion for initial stop (lane statute vs impairment) | Stop lacked reasonable suspicion under N.M. § 66-7-317 because a single touch of the fog line (with weaving within lane) did not alone constitute a violation | Officer had reasonable suspicion of impairment or lane-statute violation based on weaving plus crossing the fog line and lack of alternative explanation | Affirmed: Court predicts NM Supreme Court would find reasonable suspicion of impairment; stop was justified |
| Scope of search (detention vs consensual search) | Search exceeded traffic-stop scope and therefore was unlawful | Counsel conceded search was consensual; if consensual, scope limitation claim waived | Not decided on merits: search treated as consensual; scope challenge not resolved by court |
| Motion to reopen based on alleged impeachment evidence from unrelated Sheridan stop (Brady/Bagley) | Evidence about Lucero’s conduct in Sheridan would impeach credibility and was material; should have been disclosed and warranted reopening | Evidence not material or exculpatory; no showing Lucero acted improperly in Sheridan; CAD entries need not be exhaustive; evidence unlikely to change outcome | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion in denying reopening; evidence not material impeachment under Brady/Bagley |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel arising from plea | Trial counsel failed to investigate and unreasonably advised plea; prejudiced Harmon | Claims are undeveloped on the record and belong in collateral proceedings | Dismissed on direct appeal as presumptively without sufficient record; remand/collateral proceedings appropriate if pursued |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir.) (standards for review of suppression rulings and reasonable-suspicion analysis)
- United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir.) (Terry reasonable-suspicion principles for traffic stops)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (officer’s subjective motivations do not invalidate objectively reasonable stops)
- United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir.) (predicting state-court interpretation of state law for federal courts)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s duty to disclose favorable material evidence)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (definition of materiality for Brady disclosures)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence bearing on witness credibility may be material)