United States v. Hansen, 929 F.3d 1238

Louis Hansen was indicted on tax evasion (26 U.S.C. § 7201) and tax obstruction (26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)) for presenting checks drawn on closed accounts and a letter to the IRS claiming payment.
At his initial appearance Hansen declined appointed counsel and repeatedly advanced sovereign-citizen/tax-protester jurisdictional arguments in filings and hearings.
The district court held a Faretta-type colloquy; it warned generally about risks but, when asked whether he would be required to follow federal procedural and evidentiary rules, Hansen at one point answered “No” or otherwise gave ambiguous responses.
The court recessed to allow Hansen to consult standby counsel; after that consultation the court accepted Hansen’s waiver and allowed him to proceed pro se with standby counsel; he was later tried, convicted on both counts, and sentenced.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit examined whether the waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent, focusing on the court’s colloquy (including Hansen’s explicit denial that he understood he must follow procedural/evidentiary rules), other communications, and case-specific factors.
The court concluded the district court erred: it did not sufficiently ensure Hansen understood he personally had to obey federal procedural and evidentiary rules, and no case-specific factors cured that deficiency; it reversed and remanded to vacate judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hansen’s waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent	Hansen argued waiver invalid because the colloquy did not establish he understood the dangers of self-representation, specifically his obligation to follow federal procedural and evidentiary rules	Government argued de novo review not required, that the court adequately warned Hansen in colloquy and later pretrial remarks, standby counsel consultation and Hansen’s trial performance confirm waiver validity	Court held waiver invalid: colloquy showed ambiguous/negative responses on obligation to follow rules; court should have further clarified; no case-specific facts cured the deficiency

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (Sixth Amendment permits defendant to waive counsel if waiver is knowing and intelligent)
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (court must investigate thoroughly so waiver is made with appreciation of hazards)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (warnings of pitfalls of self-representation must be rigorously conveyed; no fixed script required)
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (pragmatic approach to what warnings required at particular stages)
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (waiver must be voluntary, knowing, intelligent)
United States v. Vann, 776 F.3d 746 (10th Cir. 2015) (Faretta hearing is preferred means but not the only way to establish knowing waiver)
United States v. Brett Williamson, 859 F.3d 843 (10th Cir. 2017) (two-part test: voluntary and knowing/intelligent waiver)
United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987) (trial judge should inquire into Von Moltke factors; no precise litany required)