United States v. Handa, 892 F.3d 95

Handa, former co-owner of Alpha Omega Jewelers, was indicted in March 2011 on 12 wire-fraud counts based on allegedly fraudulent inventory entries used to obtain bank financing.
Handa lived abroad (India/England) from late 2007 until his 2017 return; he retained U.S. citizenship and interacted with U.S. agencies while abroad.
He was arrested on February 22, 2017; he asserted a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim and moved to dismiss.
Two days before responding to the speedy-trial motion, the government filed a superseding indictment (April 26, 2017) that re‑alleged the 12 wire‑fraud counts and added a new bank‑fraud count under 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
The district court dismissed the original indictment for violation of the Sixth Amendment and later dismissed the added bank‑fraud count on speedy‑trial grounds, reasoning the delay should be measured from the 2011 indictment.
The government appealed only the dismissal of the added bank‑fraud count; the First Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding the speedy‑trial clock did not reset for the added charge on these facts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial clock start for an added charge in a superseding indictment?	Handa: Count’s delay measured from the original indictment (2011) because added charge arises from same scheme and government could have charged earlier.	Government: Clock should start from superseding indictment (2017); adding a new charge resets the constitutional clock unless double jeopardy or due process bars prosecution.	The Court: Clock did not reset. If added charge is based on same act/transaction or part of same scheme and government could have charged earlier with diligence, measure delay from original indictment.
Are Double Jeopardy/Due Process the only constitutional limits on adding charges late?	Handa: Sixth Amendment also constrains timing; cannot be circumvented by adding charges after prejudicial delay.	Government: Double Jeopardy (and possibly Due Process) alone limit late additions; Sixth Amendment need not apply to start‑date for added counts.	The Court: Rejected government’s view. Sixth Amendment has independent force; cannot be nullified simply because a new charge is not precluded by Double Jeopardy.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (establishes four‑factor speedy‑trial test)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (delay threshold and presumption of prejudice principles)
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (measured delay from initial indictment; discussed allocation of time under Barker factors)
United States v. Irizarry-Colón, 848 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2017) (measured delay from first indictment where superseding indictment did not add new charges)
United States v. Worthy, 772 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2014) (measured delay from original arrest/indictment despite multiple superseding indictments adding counts)
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (test for whether two offenses are the same for Double Jeopardy purposes)