United States v. Hampton
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6222
| 7th Cir. | 2012

Background

  • Hampton was arrested for unlawful firearm possession by a felon after discarding a loaded handgun during a foot chase in Kankakee, Illinois.
  • At the jail, Hampton signed a Miranda waiver and began to talk but then invoked counsel; questioning stopped and he was escorted to his cell.
  • Hampton later reinitiated contact with officers without counsel, and the remainder of the interview was audiorecorded after new Miranda warnings.
  • During the recorded portion, Hampton ambiguously stated, “Yeah, I do, but you…,” suggesting possible invocation but not an unequivocal request for counsel.
  • A district court denied suppression, concluding Hampton reinitiated and did not unequivocally invoke counsel; the statement was admitted at trial and he was convicted.
  • At sentencing, Hampton was designated as an armed career criminal based on three prior felonies, including an Illinois aggravated battery with insulting or provoking contact to a peace officer, leading to a 15-year minimum and a guidelines range of 235–293 months; the district court imposed 252 months.
  • The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing, holding no Miranda/Edwards violation but that the Illinois insult­ing or provoking contact offense is not a violent felony under the ACCA.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Was Hampton’s custodial statement obtained in violation of Miranda/Edwards? Hampton argued the interrogation violated his right to counsel after invoking it. The officers stopped when counsel was invoked and Hampton later reinitiated; no unambiguous invocation occurred. No Miranda/Edwards violation; interrogation was properly conducted after reinitiation.
Is the Illinois insult­ing or provoking physical contact with a peace officer a violent felony under the ACCA? Hampton contends the offense qualifies as violent under ACCA’s residual clause due to risk to officers. The offense generally does not pose the required risk, given the generic nature of the act. Not a violent felony under ACCA; vacate sentence and remand for resentencing.

Key Cases Cited

  • Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (Supreme Court 1994) (ambiguous vs. unequivocal invocation standard; defendant’s statement context matters)
  • Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court 1981) (right to counsel; interrogation must cease until counsel is available)
  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court 1966) (mandatory warnings prior to custodial interrogation)
  • United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2005) (de novo review of suppression rulings; clear/unambiguous invocation standard)
  • United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering surrounding circumstances to determine ambiguity of counsel request)
  • James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (Supreme Court 2007) (categorical approach to determine residual-clause risk)
  • Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (Supreme Court 2011) (residual clause interpretive framework for violent felonies)
  • Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court 2008) (categorical approach to determine risk of violence in ACCA context)
  • United States v. Evans, 576 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2009) (insulting or provoking contact with a peace officer not per se violent)
  • United States v. Buckley, 4 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1993) (example of evaluating ambiguous invocation contexts)
Read the full case