United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.4th 389

Ruel Hamilton, a Dallas real-estate developer, donated money to councilmember Carolyn Davis (via a nonprofit run by her associate) and directly to councilmember Dwaine Caraway; some donations were allegedly diverted to Davis personally.
Hamilton sought favorable City Council actions (a resolution recommending tax-credit projects and later placement of a paid-sick-leave ordinance on the ballot) during the relevant period.
FBI recorded a call and a recorded meeting between Hamilton and Caraway; Hamilton subsequently wrote a $7,000 check to Caraway after Caraway requested cash for personal needs.
Hamilton was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 666 for two substantive bribery counts and a conspiracy count; Davis and Scroggins pled guilty and cooperated; Hamilton was convicted by a jury and sentenced.
At trial the district court instructed the jury without stating that § 666 requires a quid pro quo or explaining the scope of "corruptly" or the interplay with the First Amendment; it also denied an entrapment instruction regarding Caraway.
The Fifth Circuit held that § 666 requires a quid pro quo (not mere gratuities), found the jury instruction unclear because it permitted a gratuity theory, and vacated Hamilton’s convictions; the court also concluded Hamilton was entitled to an entrapment instruction as to the Caraway-related count.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 666 criminalizes mere gratuities or requires a quid pro quo	§ 666 need not require a quid pro quo; statute-language (including “reward”) permits conviction for gratuities	§ 666, like § 201(b), requires a specific quid pro quo (intent to influence an official act)	§ 666 requires a quid pro quo; mere gratuities are not criminal under § 666
Whether the district court’s jury instruction was legally sufficient	A statute‑tracking instruction is adequate; no explicit quid‑pro‑quo language necessary	Instruction was deficient because it did not explain quid pro quo or define “corruptly” and allowed gratuity theory	Instruction was erroneous/unclear and permitted conviction on a non‑existent gratuity theory; convictions vacated
Whether Hamilton was entitled to an entrapment instruction re: Caraway meeting	Government contends entrapment not established	Hamilton showed prima facie lack of predisposition and government involvement beyond opportunity	Hamilton was entitled to an entrapment instruction; alternate basis to vacate at least one § 666 conviction
If ambiguity exists, whether rule of lenity applies	Government: statute clear enough to sustain convictions	Defendant: any reasonable doubt about § 666’s scope resolves in favor of defendant	Court relied on plain‑text holding but noted rule of lenity would require interpreting § 666 in defendant’s favor if ambiguity remained

Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal. v. United States, 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (bribery requires quid pro quo; distinguishes illegal gratuity)
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (context for § 666’s enactment to reach state/local officials receiving federal funds)
United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) (§ 666 covers only quid pro quo; “reward” does not create separate gratuity offense)
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (limits on official‑action concepts relevant to corruption prosecutions)
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991) (standards for distinguishing bribery from gratuity in federal law)
United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009) (jury‑instruction principles; sufficiency of give‑and‑take language in certain contexts)
Jarkesy v. SEC, 34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022) (discusses rule of lenity and interpretive canons referenced by the court)