585 F.Supp.3d 21
D.D.C.2022Background
- Defendant Christopher R. Grider is one of 700+ defendants charged for conduct at the January 6, 2021 Capitol breach; the indictment includes one felony count (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)) and six misdemeanors.
- Allegations: Grider traveled from Texas, entered the Capitol, advanced to the Speaker’s Lobby outside the House floor, tried to force/kick open doors, handed a helmet to another rioter who helped break a door window, and was at the front of the mob when a rioter was shot.
- Count Four charges obstruction of an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)) by aiding and abetting the disruption of the Electoral College vote certification.
- Grider moved to dismiss Count Four on four grounds: (1) the Electoral College certification is not an "official proceeding," (2) subsection (c)(2) is limited to evidence/witness tampering, (3) the mens rea term "corruptly" is unconstitutionally vague as applied, and (4) the rule of lenity requires a narrow reading.
- The Court reviewed statutory text, precedent, and related authority and denied Grider’s amended motion to dismiss Count Four.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Electoral College certification is an "official proceeding" under §1515(a)(1)(B) | Certification is a formal, ceremonious joint session of Congress and qualifies as an official proceeding | Certification is not an "official proceeding" for §1512(c)(2); only adjudicative/evidentiary congressional proceedings qualify | Held: Certification is an "official proceeding" under §1515(a)(1)(B); motion denied |
| Scope of "otherwise obstruct, influence, or impede" in §1512(c)(2) | "Otherwise" covers obstructive acts aimed at the proceeding itself, not limited to document/evidence tampering | "Otherwise" must be read ejusdem generis narrow to acts like (c)(1) (tampering with records/evidence) | Held: "Otherwise" is not limited to evidence tampering; (c)(2) reaches obstructive conduct that impedes the proceeding |
| Vagueness of the mens rea "corruptly" | Statute gives fair notice; precedent defines "corruptly" to require intent/nexus; not vague as applied here | "Corruptly" is unconstitutionally vague (Poindexter) as applied to Grider's conduct | Held: "Corruptly" is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; requires intent to obstruct and a nexus to the proceeding |
| Rule of lenity | No grievous ambiguity in §1512(c)(2) after traditional interpretation tools; lenity not triggered | Ambiguity about the statute’s scope requires lenity and narrow construction | Held: Rule of lenity does not apply; no unresolved ambiguity after interpretation tools |
Key Cases Cited
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (construed "corruptly" to require consciousness of wrongdoing and nexus to proceeding)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (discussed limits of "otherwise" and ejusdem generis canon)
- Ermoian v. United States, 752 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (distinguished informal investigations from "official proceedings")
- Poindexter v. United States, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (earlier vagueness decision on "corruptly")
- Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015) (rule of lenity consideration in statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (prosecution may proceed under any statute that applies)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (vagueness doctrine standard)
- United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (clarified lenity vs. vagueness inquiries)