United States v. Greyer
1:22-cr-00318
| E.D.N.Y | Aug 8, 2023Background
- Defendants Jonathon Bryant, Kendell Greyer, and Charles Thomas were charged in a Superseding Indictment with Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and with brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- The § 924(c) counts are predicated on completed Hobbs Act robberies (not on attempted robberies). Bryant and Greyer are tied to a June 30, 2022 T‑Mobile store robbery; Bryant and Thomas are tied to alleged June 16, 2022 robberies; Thomas is also charged in later robberies.
- Bryant moved to dismiss the § 924(c) counts arguing that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a "crime of violence" post‑Taylor; Greyer joined as to his § 924(c) count. Thomas joined those arguments and further contended facts support only a conspiracy/aid‑and‑abet theory (he never entered stores or brandished a firearm).
- Legal question centers on whether completed Hobbs Act robbery necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force under § 924(c)(3)(A) after United States v. Taylor.
- The court applied the categorical approach and considered whether the Second Circuit’s realistic‑probability/Duenas‑Alvarez framework (as applied in United States v. Hill) survived Taylor.
- Court denied the motions: held that Hill remains good law, Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence, defendants’ hypotheticals fail, and aiding/abetting liability does not bar § 924(c) exposure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether completed Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a "crime of violence" under § 924(c) after Taylor | Government: Hobbs Act robbery overlaps with § 924(c) elements; Hill and post‑Taylor precedent control | Bryant et al.: Taylor repudiates the realistic‑probability test and therefore Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence | Denied—Hill remains good law; completed Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence |
| Whether Taylor eliminated the realistic‑probability/Duenas‑Alvarez inquiry for § 924(c) predicates | Def.: Taylor forecloses reliance on Duenas‑Alvarez and realistic‑probability test | Gov.: Taylor does not disturb Hill where elements overlap; realistic‑probability applies when needed | Denied—Taylor did not implicitly overrule Hill; realistic‑probability remains applicable where elements overlap |
| Whether hypothetical non‑force scenarios (future economic threats; threats of self‑harm to induce surrender) show Hobbs Act robbery can occur without force | Def.: Hobbs Act robbery’s "fear" and "property" language could cover economic/intangible coercion or threats to induce consent, so not all robberies involve force | Gov.: Such hypotheticals more properly describe Hobbs Act extortion; robbery’s "fear of injury" must be fear of injury from force | Denied—hypotheticals describe extortion or rare facts and do not show Hobbs Act robbery lacks a force element |
| Whether aiding and abetting (or not physically entering/brandishing) precludes § 924(c) liability for a defendant who did not personally use force | Thomas: He never entered or brandished a gun so § 924(c) cannot apply to him | Gov.: Aiding and abetting is a theory of liability for the underlying Hobbs Act robbery; Rosemond and § 2 principles apply | Denied—aiding/abetting does not negate that the underlying Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence and can serve as a § 924(c) predicate |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (rejected using realistic‑probability approach where elements do not overlap)
- United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.) (completed Hobbs Act robbery is categorically a crime of violence)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (realistic‑probability test for applying a state statute to nongeneric conduct)
- United States v. McCoy, 58 F.4th 72 (2d Cir.) (post‑Taylor reaffirmation that completed Hobbs Act robberies are crimes of violence)
- Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (aiding and abetting intent standard and accomplice liability principles)
- Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282 (distinguishing robbery from extortion; consent indicates extortion)
- United States v. Chappelle, 41 F.4th 102 (2d Cir.) (analysis of Hobbs Act robbery under an elements‑clause context)