United States v. Gregory Randolph Berry
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 23398
11th Cir.2012Background
- Berry, a federal prisoner, was convicted of a crack cocaine offense and sentenced in 2002.
- His offense level and range were determined by career-offender status, not drug-quantity tables, yielding a 360 months to life range, and life due to a mandatory minimum.
- Berry was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)–two prior felony drug convictions–creating a life mandatory minimum.
- Amendment 750 revised U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 but did not lower Berry’s applicable range because of the § 841(b)(1)(A) life minimum.
- Berry sought relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Amendment 750 and the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA).
- The district court denied the motion, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding Amendment 750 and the FSA did not authorize relief for Berry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Amendment 750 authorizes a § 3582(c)(2) reduction where the range was set by a mandatory minimum. | Berry argues Amendment 750 lowers his range despite the mandatory minimum. | Berry's range was not lowered because of the life-minimum provision, so § 3582(c)(2) is inapplicable. | No § 3582(c)(2) reduction because mandatory minimum preserved the range. |
| Whether the Fair Sentencing Act provides retroactive relief under § 3582(c)(2) for pre-Act sentences. | Berry asserts FSA retroactively reduces penalties via § 3582(c)(2). | FSA is a statutory change, not a guidelines amendment, and does not apply retroactively to Berry. | FSA not retroactive to Berry’s 2002 sentence; no relief. |
| Whether the FSA can affect Berry through the savings clause (1 U.S.C. § 109). | Berry relies on savings clause to apply FSA penalties. | Savings clause preserves penalties but does not erase preexisting mandatory minimums. | Savings clause does not apply to reduce preexisting sentence. |
| Whether Dorsey limits or supports application of the FSA to pre-Act offenders who are sentenced pre-Act. | Berry points to Dorsey as support for applying FSA post-Act to pre-Act sentencing. | Dorsey applies only to post-Act resentencing of pre-Act offenders, not retroactive relief for Berry. | Dorsey does not authorize retroactive FSA relief for Berry. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2003) (narrow scope of § 3582(c)(2) reductions)
- United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (retroactivity depends on actual range-lowering effect of amendment)
- United States v. Gomes, 621 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (savings clause discussion and retroactivity considerations)
- United States v. Baptists, 646 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2011) (FSA not retroactive to pre-Act sentences)
- Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (FSA penalties apply to post-Act sentencing of pre-Act offenders; line-drawing implications)