United States v. Gregory Kuczora, 910 F.3d 904

Background

Kuczora ran a sham finance operation (KCS Financial and Kensington Capital Partners) from his basement and solicited underwriting fees of $10,000–$25,000 from prospective borrowers, then stalled and ceased contact.
Over ~4 years he defrauded up to 68 victims, taking between roughly $750,000 and $1,216,755 and spending proceeds on personal expenses.
A grand jury indicted him on two counts of wire fraud; he ultimately pleaded guilty to one count and did not object to the Presentence Report (PSR) findings.
The Sentencing Guidelines range was 33–41 months; the district court varied upward to impose a 70‑month sentence based on § 3553(a) factors (seriousness, sophistication, number/effect on victims, lack of remorse, deterrence).
The court heard victim testimony about severe harms (bankruptcy, homelessness, depression); Kuczora presented mitigation witnesses but the court found insufficient remorse and continued risk of recidivism.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Adequacy of explanation for upward variance	Kuczora: judge failed to adequately explain why sentence exceeded Guidelines	Government: judge explained § 3553(a) factors (seriousness, scope, victims, sophistication, deterrence) supporting variance	Affirmed — explanation was adequate; judge may justify a variance using § 3553(a) without framing as a Guidelines departure
Notice of grounds for upward variance	Kuczora: required advance notice of the facts the court would rely on for an upward variance	Government: no advance notice required; defendant had PSR and did not object; Booker discretion allows consideration of § 3553(a) factors	Affirmed — no advance notice required; defendants are on notice post-Booker of § 3553(a) considerations
Substantive reasonableness of 70‑month sentence	Kuczora: 70 months is substantively unreasonable relative to advisory range	Government: longer sentence fits gravity, scale, victim harm, sophistication, lack of remorse, and deterrence needs	Affirmed — within broad appellate discretion; sentence not substantively unreasonable
Use of Guidelines as starting point	Kuczora: judge relied on factors already in Guidelines without explaining why Guidelines were insufficient	Government: judge may start from Guidelines and explain variance via § 3553(a) without dissecting Guidelines adjustments	Affirmed — court need not articulate why specific Guidelines enhancements are inadequate if it explains § 3553(a)-based reasons

Key Cases Cited

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (courts must adequately explain chosen sentence and may vary based on § 3553(a))
United States v. Kirkpatrick, 589 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2009) (no requirement to explain differences from Sentencing Commission recommendation when § 3553(a) explanation suffices)
United States v. Lockwood, 840 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2016) (requirement that deviations be explained; interpreted here as consistent with § 3553(a)-based explanations)
United States v. Courtland, 642 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2011) (sentencing court need not frame explanation as a Guidelines departure so long as it addresses statutory factors)
United States v. Hayden, 775 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2014) (no duty to provide advance notice of above-Guidelines sentence)
United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 2006) (defendants are on notice post-Booker that courts may consider § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Aldridge, 642 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2011) (no presumption that an outside-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (advisory Guidelines and sentencing discretion under § 3553(a))