United States v. Gregory Bell
417 App. D.C. 351
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- Defendants David Wilson and Gregory Bell were tried with four others in a long-running prosecution of the Congress Park Crew; Wilson convicted of two counts of aiding and abetting first-degree murder and multiple drug and communications counts; Bell convicted of three crack-distribution counts.
- Mid-trial lead counsel (Jenifer Wicks) for Wilson became ill after several months; second-chair Gary Proctor (with limited federal trial exposure and who had missed portions of earlier testimony) was appointed lead; trial continued after a continuance and appointment of additional secondary counsel.
- Wilson was acquitted of several major charges (including some murders and conspiracies) but convicted on others; he raised ineffective-assistance, evidentiary (uncharged murders), and Brady claims; both defendants challenged sentencing enhancements based on relevant conduct and a firearm guideline increase.
- The district court admitted evidence of two uncharged murders (one as Rule 404(b) evidence, the other as intrinsic) and issued limiting instructions; it also attributed 1.5 kg of crack to each defendant for Guidelines calculation and applied a two-point firearm enhancement to Bell.
- The D.C. Circuit majority affirmed the convictions and sentences, applying Strickland rather than a Cronic presumption for mid-trial substitution, upholding admission of the murders, rejecting Brady claims, and permitting consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing within statutory limits.
- Judge Wilkins concurred in part but dissented as to Wilson’s conviction, arguing the mid-trial substitution (and resulting loss of lead counsel’s live observations and client consultations) warranted presumptive prejudice and a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mid-trial substitution / ineffective assistance (Cronic v. Strickland) | Wilson: substitution after lead counsel fell ill deprived him of effective assistance and warrants presumed prejudice because replacement missed critical testimony and prior counsel’s consultations | Government: substitute counsel was present at all critical stages after appointment; Strickland governs and Wilson cannot show actual prejudice; no constructive absence | Court: No Cronic presumption; use Strickland for fact-specific review — no ineffective assistance shown on this record |
| Admission of uncharged murders (Rule 404(b) / intrinsic evidence) | Wilson: Phillips and Reid murders improperly admitted and unduly prejudicial | Government: Phillips admissible under Rule 404(b) to show firearm familiarity; Reid intrinsic to conspiracy or at least admissible background evidence | Court: No abuse of discretion — Phillips admissible and not unduly prejudicial; Reid either intrinsic or harmless if not |
| Brady / late or suppressed police reports | Wilson: late disclosure of Carter and Doleman reports undermined ability to impeach motive and identify alternative perpetrators | Government: reports disclosed during trial or after but not materially exculpatory of motive; defendants had opportunities and evidence did not undermine verdict | Court: No Brady violation — delayed disclosures not shown to be prejudicial or to undermine confidence in verdict |
| Sentencing: use of acquitted conduct and firearm enhancement (Guidelines & Sixth Amendment) | Defendants: attributing 1.5 kg from acquitted conspiracy and applying firearm enhancement violated Sixth Amendment and rendered sentence procedurally/substantively unreasonable | Government: judge may consider acquitted or uncharged conduct by preponderance for Guidelines as long as statutory ranges not exceeded; firearm found near drug paraphernalia is relevant conduct | Court: Affirmed — considering acquitted conduct for Guidelines is permissible; Alleyne/Apprendi do not bar judicial factfinding that stays within statutory limits; firearm enhancement properly applied to Bell |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (presumption of prejudice in narrow circumstances involving constructive denial of counsel or interference with counsel’s function)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose materially exculpatory or impeaching evidence)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts increasing statutory mandatory minimum are elements for jury finding)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
- Watts v. United States, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (acquittal does not bar consideration of the same conduct at sentencing under a lower proof standard)
- United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (right to counsel of choice is distinct from claims of ineffective assistance and requires prejudice showing for IAC)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (judge may consider facts not found by a jury at sentencing; Guidelines review deference)
- United States v. Jones, 744 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (prior panel decision upholding related sentencing attributions and binding circuit precedent)