United States v. Gregorio Paniagua-Garcia, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2800

Indiana statute prohibits drivers from typing, transmitting, or reading text or email messages while operating a vehicle; other cellphone uses remain lawful.
An Indiana trooper observed Paniagua holding a cellphone with his head bent toward it and inferred he was "texting."
The officer stopped Paniagua, questioned him, obtained consent to search the car, and found five pounds of heroin in the spare tire.
Paniagua was convicted after pleading guilty but reserved and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the heroin as the product of an unlawful stop.
The government conceded the phone logs showed no texting at the time; the government argued the officer had a reasonable suspicion (or reasonably believed) texting occurred.
The district court upheld the stop; the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that a texting violation had occurred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Paniagua for violating Indiana's texting ban	Paniagua: officer observed conduct consistent with many lawful cellphone uses, so no reasonable suspicion of texting	Government: officer reasonably believed Paniagua was texting based on posture and handling of phone	Reversed — observation was consistent with lawful uses; no reasonable suspicion of a texting violation
Whether a mere possibility of unlawful cellphone use justifies a stop	Paniagua: mere possibility is insufficient; would allow broad, unconstitutional stops	Government: possibility can suffice when officer reasonably infers texting	Rejected — possibility alone is too broad to satisfy Fourth Amendment
Whether mistake-of-fact about texting can cure lack of suspicion	Paniagua: no; officer’s mistaken belief must still be objectively reasonable	Government: officer reasonably (though incorrectly) believed texting occurred	Court found the officer did not have an objectively reasonable basis for the belief
Whether the stop complied with Fourth Amendment standards for seizures	Paniagua: stop required probable cause or reasonable suspicion and neither existed here	Government: the stop was a lawful seizure based on suspicion of a traffic offense	Court held the seizure was unlawful because the required reasonable suspicion was lacking

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (4th Amendment seizure standard for traffic stops)
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (reasonable suspicion from observed facts can justify stop)
United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.) (stopping a substantial portion of lawful drivers is not reasonable suspicion)
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (reasonable suspicion must be particularized and objective)
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (random stops of motorists without cause violate Fourth Amendment)
United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752 (3d Cir.) (distinguishing suspicion from reasonable suspicion)
State v. Rabanales-Ramos, 359 P.3d 250 (Ore. App.) (observations of cellphone use are consistent with lawful and unlawful uses)