United States v. Gray
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16327
| 7th Cir. | 2011Background
- Gray was convicted of Medicaid fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347 and conspiracy under § 371, and sentenced to 33 months with restitution of $846,115.
- Suddoth pleaded guilty to the fraud, testified for the government, and admitted involvement with a fraudulent medical-transport operation.
- Dovies Medicar billed Indiana Medicaid for ambulance services that were not provided; Gray helped set up the billing and managed electronic submissions.
- After EDS processed Medicaid payments, substantial funds were deposited to a joint account from which Gray withdrew hundreds of thousands for personal investments.
- EDS later produced timestamp data showing implausibly close billing times on July 15, 2004, suggesting multiple billers; defense sought these data pretrial.
- The government generated a timestamp extraction during trial and disclosed exculpatory timestamp results mid-trial; Gray argued this violated Brady.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether timestamp data from EDS constitutes Brady material | Gray argues data were exculpatory but undisclosed; Brady requires disclosure. | Gray contends the government was obligated to disclose latent exculpatory data. | No reversible Brady error; not concealed in a way that changed outcome. |
| Whether the government had a broader Brady duty to create/extract exculpatory data | Gray asserts duty to extract exculpatory data from databases. | State need not create exculatory evidence; not required to run defense's investigation. | Brady duty not extended to compel creation of exculpatory data. |
| Whether the timestamp evidence is patent or latent exculpatory evidence | Timestamp data are exculpatory on their face (latent at first). | Evidence required processing; not obviously exculpatory at outset. | Timestamp data are latent exculpatory evidence; Brady applies only if suppressed. |
| Whether the trial judge's handling of Suddoth's illness affected due process | Judge cited Suddoth’s illness; defense objected to implying malingering. | Judge's remarks were non-reversible; scope of cross-examination unchanged. | Not reversible error; conduct insufficient to prejudice Gray. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (exculpatory evidence must be disclosed when material)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (due process and discovery of exculpatory material)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality of exculpatory evidence and suppression effects)
- Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.2004) (extension of Brady to investigators and teams)
- United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir.2010) (court refuses duty to sift vast data for exculpatory material)
- United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.2009) ( Brady analysis linked to availability of exculpatory evidence)
- United States v. Dawson, 425 F.3d 389 (7th Cir.2005) (considerations of Brady material and trial strategy)