652 F.Supp.3d 112
D.D.C.2023Background
- Daniel Paul Gray was indicted on nine counts arising from Jan. 6, 2021, including Count II (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) — obstruction of an official proceeding) and Count IX (40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G) — parading/demonstrating in a Capitol building), and challenged those counts and alleged multiplicity.
- Gray moved to dismiss Count II for failure to state an offense, arguing § 1512(c)(2) does not cover his conduct, that subsection (c)(2) is limited by (c)(1), and that the term “corruptly” is unconstitutionally vague or requires a pecuniary motive.
- Gray moved to dismiss Count IX on grounds that § 5104(e)(2)(G) fails to state an offense, is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment (facial and as-applied), and is unconstitutionally vague.
- He also moved to dismiss several counts as multiplicative/double jeopardy concerns, claiming overlapping statutory formulations amount to the same offense.
- The Court evaluated statutory text, statutory definitions (including the definition of “official proceeding”), Supreme Court precedent on statutory construction and vagueness, and numerous D.D.C. decisions addressing Jan. 6 § 1512(c)(2) challenges, and denied all three motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Gray) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency/notice of Count II (§1512(c)(2)) | Indictment tracks statute, identifies the official proceeding (Electoral College certification) and time/place; provides fair notice. | Indictment lacks factual allegations tying Gray to obstructing the proceeding; insufficient to prepare defense. | Denied — indictment need only state elements in statutory words and fairly inform defendant; factual sufficiency is for the jury. |
| Scope of §1512(c)(2): whether limited to document-related conduct or by (c)(1) | §1512(c)(2) criminalizes corrupt obstruction of any official proceeding; (c)(2) not limited by (c)(1). | (c)(2) must be read in light of (c)(1) (per Miller): “otherwise” confines (c)(2) to document/record-related acts. | Denied — Court follows D.D.C. decisions rejecting Miller; statutory structure and text show (c)(2) reaches obstruction of proceedings not limited to document alteration. |
| Meaning of “corruptly”: vagueness and pecuniary-motive requirement | Term has determinable legal meaning (dishonesty/improper purpose); does not require pecuniary motive; not void for vagueness on its face. | “Corruptly” is vague because courts use varied formulations; it requires proof of pecuniary motive or unlawful financial benefit. | Denied — relying on Arthur Andersen and circuit decisions, “corruptly” denotes wrongful/improper purpose, conscious wrongdoing; not unconstitutionally vague nor limited to pecuniary motive. |
| Count IX (§5104(e)(2)(G)) — First Amendment overbreadth/as-applied and vagueness | Statute targets conduct (parade/demonstrate/picket) inside Capitol, is viewpoint neutral, limited to interior, and reasonable for a nonpublic forum; not overbroad or vague. | Statute criminalizes broad expressive conduct (e.g., wearing political shirts, broadcasting) and is vague/overbroad as applied to protected speech. | Denied — Capitol interior is a nonpublic forum; statute regulates conduct not speech, is viewpoint-neutral and reasonable; statutory terms provide fair notice and are not unconstitutionally vague. |
| Multiplicity / Double Jeopardy | Each charged statute requires at least one element distinct from the others (Blockburger test satisfied). | Several counts are duplicative/lesser-included variants of same conduct (e.g., trespass/parading; assault/violence counts). | Denied — applying Blockburger, each count requires proof of an additional fact the others do not; counts are not multiplicative. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (indictment may track statutory language and still be sufficient)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (definition of “corruptly” as conscious wrongdoing; guidance on mens rea)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (interpretation of residual/“otherwise” clauses relevant to statutory construction)
- Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (interpretation of omnibus clause; discussion of nexus and statutory specificity)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (test for multiplicity/double jeopardy)
- United States v. Williamson, 903 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir.) (indictment sufficiency principles)
- United States v. Ballestas, 795 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir.) (court assumes truth of indictment allegations on Rule 12(b)(3) motion)
- United States v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir.) (vagueness doctrine and ordinary meaning of statutory terms)