United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio
663 F.3d 419
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Gonzalez-Aparicio, a Mexican national, was previously deported after a 2000 Arizona conviction for sexual conduct with a minor under 15.
- PSR notes the 1999 arrest and 2000 disposition; sentence amended the day after deportation, with potential revocation prospects.
- Gonzalez-Aparicio reentered the U.S. after the first deportation and was removed again in 2009.
- In 2009 he pled guilty to attempted reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, enhanced by § 1326(b)(2).
- PSR calculated base offense 8, added 16-level enhancement for prior deportation following a conviction for sexual conduct with a minor, total level 22; criminal history III; guideline range 51–63 months; district court sentenced to 51 months.
- Defense did not object to the PSR’s “crime of violence” designation, but sought a shorter sentence reflecting mitigating factors and family circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 16-level enhancement was proper as a crime of violence | Gonzalez-Aparicio | Gonzalez-Aparicio contends the prior Arizona conviction is not a generic ‘statutory rape’ crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) | No plain error; the court properly used the modified categorical approach and/or deference to record-based analysis. |
| Whether plain-error review governs the sentencing error | Gonzalez-Aparicio | The issue is a pure legal question not preserved below, with prejudice to government | Declined to apply plain-error review overall; however, the court ultimately affirmed under plain-error framework. |
| Whether the modified categorical approach could be applied given the PSR’s use of court records | Gonzalez-Aparicio | Government argues documentation supports a statutory-rape categorization | The court found no plain error in applying the modified categorical approach based on properly documented conviction facts. |
| Whether Estrada-Espinoza governs the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor for sentencing | Gonzalez-Aparicio | Government relies on Estrada-Espinoza to define ‘statutory rape’ and its elements | Court acknowledged ambiguity but held no plain error; the Arizona statute’s age-difference element did not clearly map to the generic offense. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 F.2d 575 (Supreme Court, 1990) (establishes the categorical approach for determining ‘crime of violence’)
- Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147 (Ninth Cir., en banc, 2008) (defines sexual abuse of a minor for immigration aggravated felony context; discusses age-difference element)
- Rodriguez-Guzman v. United States, 506 F.3d 738 (Ninth Cir., 2007) (holds that ‘crime of violence’ definitions may be per se under the Guidelines)
- Medina-Villa v. Mukasey, 567 F.3d 507 (Ninth Cir., 2009) (distinguishes two generic definitions of sexual abuse of a minor under § 2L1.2)
- Rivera-Cuartas v. Holder, 605 F.3d 699 (Ninth Cir., 2010) (Arizona statute not satisfying Estrada-Espinoza for statutory rape; modified applicability discussed)
- Gomez-Mendez v. United States, 486 F.3d 599 (Ninth Cir., 2007) (statutory rape concept and age-difference elements discussed in context of § 2L1.2)
- Aguila-Montes de Oca v. United States, 655 F.3d 915 (Ninth Cir., 2011) (en banc; clarifies use of the modified categorical approach)
- Corona-Sanchez v. United States, 291 F.3d 1201 (Ninth Cir., 2002) (PSR cannot alone establish elements for modified categorical approach)