647 F.Supp.3d 538
E.D. Ky.2022Background:
- Christopher Goins was convicted in Kentucky (2019) of multiple offenses: a fourth DUI, DUI with a suspended license, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana; he received jail time and probation.
- In August 2022 Goins was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possessing a pistol after a felony conviction; he moved to dismiss, arguing § 922(g)(1) as applied to a nonviolent felon violates the Second Amendment.
- The Government defended § 922(g)(1) by relying on Heller/McDonald language that felon‑possession bans are presumptively lawful and argued felons are not among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment and that history supports disarming felons.
- The controlling analytic framework is Bruen: first ask whether the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct; if so, the Government must show the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
- The court concluded Bruen requires historical analogical analysis (not interest‑balancing scrutiny) and found historical precedent supports disarming persons deemed dangerous to public safety; it denied Goins’s motion because his record (repeat DUI and drug possession) sufficiently indicates a public‑safety risk.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(1) as‑applied to a nonviolent felon (Goins) violates the Second Amendment | Goins: as a nonviolent felon his right to bear arms for self‑defense is protected under Bruen and Congress may not categorically disarm nonviolent felons | Gov: felons are not among “the people” protected or, at minimum, history supports disarming felons as a class | Denied dismissal — Court held must apply Bruen and historical tradition supports disarming those deemed dangerous; Goins’s record shows public‑safety risk |
| Whether Heller/McDonald language that felon bans are presumptively lawful remains controlling post‑Bruen | Goins: Bruen undermines Heller’s presumption and enables as‑applied challenges | Gov: Heller/McDonald dicta remain persuasive and support upholding § 922(g)(1) | Court: Bruen diminished the force of that dicta; courts must perform historical analysis rather than rely on Heller’s presumption |
| Whether the phrase “the people” excludes felons (virtue‑theory of the right) | Goins: the Framers did not categorically exclude convicted felons from “the people”; the right is individual | Gov: the right tied to virtuous citizenship — Congress can disarm the ‘unvirtuous’ (felons) | Court: rejected treating felon status as per se outside “the people”; instead examined history to determine whether disarmament is consistent with tradition |
| Whether historical tradition supports disarming nonviolent felons or only those who pose a danger to the peace | Goins: founding‑era practice did not show a consensus of automatically disarming all felons | Gov: English/colonial punishments and early statutes show power to disarm felons | Court: history shows a tradition of disarming persons who threaten public peace or safety (not an automatic civic‑death rule for all felons); applied that analogue to Goins and found his convictions indicate sufficient risk |
Key Cases Cited
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (establishes history‑and‑tradition test and rejects means‑end scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holds an individual right to possess handguns for self‑defense in the home; noted longstanding prohibitions on felons)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates Second Amendment against the states and reiterates Heller caveat about longstanding prohibitions)
- Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (dissent and analysis arguing historical inquiry should assess whether government may disable an otherwise held right rather than treat classes as outside “the people”)
- United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2010) (upheld denial of expungement and relied on Heller’s statement about felon disarmament)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussion of as‑applied challenges and presumption in favor of legislative judgment, later addressed in Bruen-era analysis)
- United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (illustrates pre‑Bruen approaches combining historical inquiry with means‑end scrutiny)