United States v. Glispie
181 N.E.3d 719
Ill.2020Background
- Jeremy Glispie had four prior Illinois convictions for residential burglary (entry with intent to steal).
- In 2018 he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon; the Government sought Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) treatment based on his burglary priors.
- ACCA enhances sentences when a defendant has three prior "violent felony" convictions; burglary qualifies if a state statute matches generic burglary (Taylor/Descamps framework).
- The district court, relying on Seventh Circuit precedent, treated Glispie’s residential-burglary convictions as ACCA predicates and sentenced him as an armed career criminal.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit questioned whether Illinois’s limited-authority doctrine (an entry is "without authority" if the entrant intends criminality) applies to the residential-burglary statute and certified that question to the Illinois Supreme Court.
- The Illinois Supreme Court held that the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary by entry.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the limited-authority doctrine applies to Illinois residential burglary (entry) | Govt: Limited-authority should not apply; rely on common-law burglary and statutory text; application would yield absurd results and subsection (a-5) shows distinct conduct | Glispie: Limited-authority applies so an entrant who intends crime lacks authority, making prior convictions non-generic for ACCA | Court: Limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary by entry; refused to decide "by remaining" |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defines "generic burglary" elements)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (state statute qualifies under ACCA only if its elements match generic burglary)
- United States v. Glispie, 943 F.3d 358 (7th Cir. 2019) (certified question to Illinois Supreme Court)
- People v. Weaver, 41 Ill.2d 434 (1968) (applied limited-authority doctrine to business-entry burglary)
- People v. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d 422 (1993) (authorization to enter a private residence is limited)
- People v. Bush, 157 Ill.2d 248 (1993) (reaffirmed limited-authority doctrine for private residences)
- People v. Bales, 108 Ill.2d 182 (1985) (distinguished burglary and residential burglary)