United States v. Glen Edward Ray, Jr.
681 F. App'x 807
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Glen Ray convicted of possession with intent to distribute ≥28 grams of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B) after police located drugs in his pocket during a traffic stop.
- Officer Duston Beal assisted at Ray’s arrest; months later Beal resigned after a pattern of improper Terry stops.
- Ray sought to introduce evidence of Beal’s resignation and pattern of unconstitutional stops to suggest misconduct that could bear on the case or credibility of the investigation.
- The district court excluded evidence about Beal’s resignation and prior Terry-stop misconduct; Ray was allowed to call and question Beal but ultimately did not call him.
- Ray appealed, asserting Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations (right to present a defense/compulsory process and due process) and arguing improper exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the excluded evidence was irrelevant or, if marginally relevant, substantially outweighed by prejudice/confusion and did not implicate Ray’s constitutional rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did exclusion of evidence about Officer Beal’s resignation and prior Terry stops violate Ray’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to present a defense? | Ray: Evidence would materially affect jury’s view of the investigation and present a complete defense; implicated compulsory process and due process. | Gov’t: Evidence unrelated to elements of offense or to Ray’s stop; would not materially affect credibility or outcome. | Court: No constitutional violation—evidence did not satisfy Hurn factors and was not a crucial, highly significant factor. |
| Was the excluded evidence admissible under relevance rules (Fed. R. Evid. 401/402)? | Ray: Evidence showed officer misconduct pattern relevant to how evidence was obtained or planted. | Gov’t: Beal did not conduct Ray’s stop and evidence did not make possession less likely; therefore irrelevant. | Court: Exclusion proper—evidence was irrelevant to issues tried and inadmissible. |
| If relevant, did Rule 403 permit exclusion due to prejudice/confusion? | Ray: Any prejudice was outweighed by probative value for defense. | Gov’t: Minimal probative value; would distract jury from central issue (possession/quantity). | Court: Even if relevant, probative value minimal and substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice/confusion; exclusion proper. |
| Was any evidentiary exclusion harmless error requiring reversal? | Ray: Exclusion affected substantial rights and denied meaningful opportunity to present defense. | Gov’t: Other evidence (officers’ testimony about drugs in pocket) and ability to call Beal made any error harmless. | Court: Any error harmless—no reasonable likelihood the exclusion affected substantial rights; affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (defendant’s right to present a complete defense)
- United States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2004) (four-part framework for compelled presentation of defense evidence)
- United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006) (standard of review for constitutional questions)
- United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779 (11th Cir. 2007) (review standard for evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011) (harmless-error standard for evidentiary rulings)
- United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994) (limits on excluding defense theories; relevance requirement)
- United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1985) (definition of relevance)
- United States v. Shelley, 405 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2005) (trial judge’s discretion under Rule 403)