United States v. Giuseppe Pileggi
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 29
4th Cir.2013Background
- Pileggi, a Canadian citizen, and dozens of co-conspirators ran a Costa Rica–based fraudulent sweepstakes targeting elderly Americans from 2003 to 2006.
- Pileggi was extradited after the U.S. agreed Costa Rica would not seek the death penalty or life imprisonment.
- At sentencing, the district court relied on Government assurances about extradition terms and imposed a 600-month term and restitution of $3,952,9852 with forfeiture of $8,381,962.
- On appeal, the panel vacated the 600‑month sentence due to reliance on clearly erroneous facts about the extradition assurances and remanded for resentencing.
- At resentencing in 2010, the district court imposed 300 months and ordered restitution of $4,274,078.40, with the government suggesting a higher amount based on a new analysis tied to Llamas.
- The district court later increased restitution to $20,726,005.18 on remand, prompting Pileggi’s challenge that the district court lacked authority to revisit restitution under the mandate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to reconsider restitution on remand | Pileggi contends remand was limited to prison term only. | Pileggi (the government) argues the court may reconsider restitution on remand. | The district court lacked authority to reconsider restitution on remand. |
| Mandate rule applicability to restitution | Restitution was not addressed on direct appeal, so waiver/mandate barred relitigation. | Government argues exceptions to mandate rule apply due to Llamas and MVRA concerns. | Mandate rule barred reconsideration of restitution on remand. |
| Effect of Pepper on remand scope | Pepper allows de novo resentencing and broader reconfiguration of sentence. | Pepper does not override mandate when remand is limited to a specific issue. | Pepper did not require reopening restitution where remand was limited to sentencing term. |
| Exceptions to mandate rule | Exceptional circumstances could justify reopening restitution. | No dramatic change in controlling authority or clear injustice shown here. | No exceptional circumstances present to depart from the mandate rule. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011) (general remand allows de novo resentencing; can reconfigure sentence)
- Bell v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64 (4th Cir. 1993) (mandate rule controls remand decisions; exceptions are narrow)
- Susi, 674 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (remanding for resentencing; discuss scope and waiver of issues)
- Llamas, 599 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2010) (MVRA losses attributed to specific offenses; not dramatic legal shift)
- Fields, 552 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2009) (rehearing after remand limited by scope of remand; issues not raised on appeal)
- Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533 (2010) (restitution within 90-day post-sentencing window; timely amendments; distinguishable facts)
- Newsome, 322 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2003) (MVRA focus on losses caused by the offense)
- Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2007) (waiver and recovery principles on remand)
- Parker, 101 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1996) (second appeal; issues not affected by error typically dismissed)