United States v. Gibbs
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24173
| 6th Cir. | 2010Background
- Gibbs, a felon, was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- At original sentencing (2006) the district court calculated a total offense level of 24 and criminal history VI, resulting in a 100–125 month range, and imposed 108 months consecutive to a yet-undischarged state parole sentence.
- On remand (2009) Gibbs challenged the district court’s failure to recalculate the Guidelines range and to impose a concurrent or partially concurrent sentence, or to credit time served to the federal term.
- The remand was general, allowing reconsideration of Guidelines and sentence length, not just the concurrent/consecutive issue.
- On remand, the district court again imposed 108 months with credit for time served beginning January 10, 2006, but did not recalibrate the Guidelines range; Gibbs appealed.
- The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that post-Chambers/Begay developments render the prior two offenses—escape and resisting/obstructing an officer—non-qualifying as crimes of violence, requiring resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the remand allowed de novo Guidelines recalculation | Gibbs contends remand allowed reconsideration of Guidelines range | United States argues remand limited to the specific issue of concurrency | Remand was general; court could reconsider Guidelines calculation on remand |
| Whether § 5G1.3(c) required a concurrent sentence | Gibbs argues district court should have imposed concurrent/partially concurrent or credited time served | Government contends discretion existed but district court did not err | No error; § 5G1.3(c) did not apply because Gibbs had no undischarged term at remand; discretion exercised within law |
| Whether amendments to Guidelines affected criminal history calculation | Amendment 709 could change prior-sentences counting | Amendment not retroactive and would not change range even if applied | Amendment 709 not retroactive; even if applied, range unchanged due to remaining counts |
| Whether two prior convictions were “crimes of violence” under the guidelines | Convictions counted as crimes of violence under Taylor/Begay framework | Walkaway escape and related offense do not categorically constitute crimes of violence; some do not pose the requisite risk | Walkaway escape and resisting/obstructing an officer do not qualify as crimes of violence; quarterbacked by Shepard analysis; vacate and remand for resentencing |
| Plain-error standard and resulting sentence impact | Error in crime-of-violence classification affected offense level | No plain error found; proper analysis followed | Plain error established; vacate sentence and remand for resentencing under corrected law |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (definition of crime of violence limited to closely related categories)
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (escape offenses not always crimes of violence under residual clause)
- Ford v. United States, 560 F.3d 420 (2009) (walkaway/escape distinctions after Chambers; two-category approach)
- Mosley v. United States, 575 F.3d 603 (2009) (holding walkaway-like offenses not categorically crimes of violence; Shepard inquiry applied)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach to prior offenses for criminal history/violence)