United States v. Geshik-O-Binese Martin
777 F.3d 984
| 8th Cir. | 2015Background
- On Jan. 1, 2011, Craig Roy and Darla Beaulieu were stabbed and their house set on fire on the Red Lake Indian Reservation; both died of exsanguination.
- Geshik-O-Binese Martin and Edward Robinson were convicted of robbery and murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1153; David Martin was convicted of robbery and acquitted of murder; other codefendants had mixed outcomes and two pled guilty earlier.
- Geshik Martin signed a pretrial stipulation that he was an “Indian” for purposes of § 1153; Robinson did not contest Indian status but sought severance because defenses were antagonistic.
- During jury selection the district judge spoke ex parte to the 51-person venire about jury service, differences between federal and state judges, jury nullification, and cited high-profile trials; defense counsel had consented to the judge meeting the venire but not the full substance of his remarks.
- At trial key eyewitness testimony (Terin Stately) placed the group at Roy’s home and described blood, a weapon, and statements suggesting killings and arson; Geshik and David Martin testified claiming different versions (self-defense or limited purpose).
- District court denied severance motions, declined David Martin’s requested lesser-included theft instruction, admitted Geshik Martin’s stipulation, allowed the prosecutor’s closing that pointed out which defendants testified, and applied a six-level guidelines enhancement to David Martin for infliction of permanent bodily injury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex parte contact with jury venire (judge spoke to venire outside presence of defendants) | Appellants: judge’s comments (nullification, high-profile cases, lawyer stereotypes) violated Rule 43(a) and due process; presumptively prejudicial. | Government/District Court: remarks were largely ministerial; defendants consented to meeting; any error was harmless. | Court: Remarks mostly ministerial and harmless; any Rule 43/constitutional violation would be harmless — no new trial. |
| Sufficiency/validity of stipulation that Geshik Martin is an “Indian” under § 1153 | Martin: stipulation only established racial status, not the statutory elements (Indian blood + tribal/federal recognition); also not shown to be knowingly and voluntarily entered. | Government: stipulation explicitly tied to § 1153 in indictment; signed in open court with counsel present; no objection. | Court: Stipulation sufficient for § 1153 purpose and was knowingly/voluntarily entered; no reversible error. |
| Severance for Robinson and prosecutor’s closing reference to who testified (possible comment on silence) | Robinson: joint trial prejudiced him because defenses were antagonistic and prosecutor’s remark impermissibly drew attention to his not testifying. | Government: independent evidence tied to Robinson; prosecutor’s remark targeted impeachment of other witnesses (not a comment on Robinson’s silence). | Court: Denial of severance not an abuse—ample independent evidence; prosecutor’s remark rebutted Geshik’s testimony and was not a Griffin violation. |
| Lesser-included offense (theft) & sentencing enhancement based on acquitted conduct | David Martin: requested theft instruction; argued sentencing six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2B3.1(b)(3)(C) improperly relied on acquitted conduct and unforeseeability of permanent injury. | Government: evidence showed violent robbery (no basis for theft instruction); sentencing may consider acquitted conduct by preponderance and Martin foresaw potential violence. | Court: Refusal to give theft instruction proper because defendant claimed complete innocence; sentencing enhancement properly applied (acquitted conduct may be considered by preponderance and facts supported foreseeability). |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (Sup. Ct.) (defendant’s presence at certain proceedings discussed)
- United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (Sup. Ct.) (ex parte communications between judge and jurors risky and may create misleading impressions)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (Sup. Ct.) (mutually antagonistic defenses not per se a reason to sever; severance required only for serious risk of prejudice)
- Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (Sup. Ct.) (prohibition on prosecutorial comment about defendant’s failure to testify)
- Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (Sup. Ct.) (court should not lightly infer prosecutor intended most damaging meaning from ambiguous remark)
- United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (Sup. Ct.) (sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct by a preponderance)
- United States v. Koskela, 86 F.3d 122 (8th Cir.) (ex parte judge–juror contacts presumptively prejudicial but can be harmless)
- Shelton v. Purkett, 563 F.3d 404 (8th Cir.) (ministerial ex parte contacts are not prejudicial)
- United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759 (8th Cir.) (definition of “Indian” under § 1153 requires Indian blood and tribal/federal recognition)
- United States v. Nazarenus, 983 F.2d 1480 (8th Cir.) (stipulations construed according to their clear purport)
