77 F.4th 424
6th Cir.2023Background
- In Chattanooga, Gerald Lynn Campbell brandished a pistol, told road workers he had a bullet for each of them, and was later found with a semi-automatic pistol; he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- The government sought ACCA treatment (mandatory 15-year minimum) based on Campbell’s prior convictions: Tennessee robbery (Aug. 1985), Tennessee aggravated assault (Apr. 1987), Tennessee drug trafficking (Aug. 1992), and two Virginia drug trafficking convictions (Dec. 1992; Mar. 1993).
- Campbell objected that Tennessee robbery is not an ACCA violent felony (arguing negligent threats or non-violent threats could suffice), that the drug offenses were not on different “occasions,” and that the separateness question must be decided by a jury under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
- He also challenged an Eastern District of Tennessee standard supervised-release condition requiring a defendant to notify third parties if a probation officer determines the defendant poses “a risk,” claiming vagueness and unlawful delegation to probation officers.
- The district court overruled objections, treated robbery and three drug convictions as ACCA predicates, imposed 180 months’ imprisonment, and Campbell appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee robbery qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" under the elements clause | Campbell: statute can sweep negligent threats or non-physical threats (so fails the elements/mens rea requirement) | Government: Tennessee robbery requires knowing/purposeful use or threat of physical force; longstanding precedent treats it as a violent felony | Held: Robbery is a violent felony under Sixth Circuit precedent; Campbell's arguments foreclosed by case law |
| Whether the three drug convictions were committed on "occasions different from one another" for ACCA purposes | Campbell: trafficking convictions reflect a common ongoing purpose; relevant-conduct treatment shows they are the same occasion | Government: Wooden factors (timing, location, character, relationship) show months and geographic separation support distinct occasions | Held: Offenses separated by months and (in two instances) ~800 miles are distinct occasions; ACCA predicates stand |
| Whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury to find that prior offenses occurred on different occasions | Campbell: separateness is a fact that must be charged and proved to a jury | Government: sentencing judge may resolve separateness; precedent permits judicial factfinding | Held: Precedent controls — a sentencing judge may decide the occasions question; Campbell had admitted dates anyway |
| Whether the supervised-release risk-notification condition is unconstitutionally vague or an unlawful delegation | Campbell: term "risk" and the officer’s discretion are vague; condition delegates core judicial authority to probation officers | Government: condition was narrowed to risks from defendant’s criminal history and court retained ultimate authority; similar conditions upheld | Held: Condition is not impermissibly vague, and no improper delegation where court reserved ultimate authority; plain-error review fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) (mens rea principles for threatening communications)
- Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (recklessness insufficient for certain violent-felony definitions)
- Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022) (multi-factor "occasions" analysis for ACCA)
- United States v. Williams, 39 F.4th 342 (6th Cir. 2022) (applying Wooden factors to occasions inquiry)
- United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. 2014) (Tennessee robbery as categorical violent felony)
- United States v. Belcher, 40 F.4th 430 (6th Cir. 2022) (rejecting challenges to Tennessee robbery and ACCA predicates)
- United States v. Smith, 70 F.4th 348 (6th Cir. 2023) (categorical approach overview)
- United States v. White, 58 F.4th 889 (6th Cir. 2023) (mens rea requirement discussion)
- United States v. Cruz, 49 F.4th 646 (1st Cir. 2022) (upholding similar risk-notification condition)
- United States v. Janis, 995 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 2021) (upholding revised risk-notification condition)
- United States v. Gibson, 998 F.3d 415 (9th Cir. 2021) (rejecting vagueness challenge to risk condition)
- United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015) (criticizing broader prior risk-notification language)
- United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018) (addressing vagueness of prior language)
- United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding similar condition vague)
- United States v. Shultz, 733 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2013) (due-process vagueness standard for supervised-release conditions)
- Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) (limits on delegating core judicial punishment functions)