United States v. Gerald Bainbridge
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4227
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Gerald Lynn Bainbridge pleaded guilty to Assault with Intent to Kidnap after admitting violent sexual acts against a disabled woman; sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release.
- At sentencing the district court required sex-offender registration but declined additional sex-offender conditions, leaving open Probation to seek modification later.
- After release, Probation petitioned to add conditions including a sexual deviancy evaluation, treatment, polygraph testing, and limiting contact with minors; the Government moved for a sexual deviancy evaluation to assess need for further conditions.
- The district court (in a sealed order) granted the Government’s motion requiring Bainbridge to undergo a sexual deviancy evaluation; Bainbridge appealed asserting lack of jurisdiction without changed circumstances and that the order was unreasonable.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed jurisdiction de novo and abuse of discretion for the condition, and affirmed: § 3583(e)(2) permits modification absent changed circumstances and the evaluation was a permissible, reasonable condition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3583(e)(2) authorizes modification of supervised-release conditions absent a change in circumstances | Bainbridge: district court lacked jurisdiction because no changed circumstances or new rehabilitation methods existed | Government/District Court: § 3583(e)(2) contains no changed-circumstances requirement; court may modify under statutory factors and Rule 32.1(c) | Court: No changed-circumstances requirement; modification permitted without such a showing | |
| Whether ordering a sexual deviancy evaluation was an abuse of discretion | Bainbridge: evaluation was speculative, a ‘‘fishing expedition,’’ and improperly related to a non-sex-offense conviction | Government/District Court: evaluation reasonably related to deterrence, protection of public, and treatment given admitted violent sexual conduct | Court: No abuse of discretion; evaluation reasonably related and necessary to assess need for further conditions | |
| Whether law-of-the-case or waiver barred modification | Bainbridge: prior sentencing remarks preclude later modification; government waived right to seek modifications | Bainbridge cites prior record suggesting closing the issue | Court: law-of-the-case is discretionary and sentencing expressly allowed future Probation motion; no waiver by Government | Court: Neither law-of-the-case nor waiver barred the modification |
| Whether the evaluation implicates a heightened liberty interest requiring heightened findings | Bainbridge: psychosexual testing implicates significant liberty interests, requiring heightened justification | Government: Ninth Circuit precedent does not treat such testing as implicating a particularly significant liberty interest | Court: Argument waived on appeal and Ninth Circuit precedent does not require heightened findings; no heightened showing required | Court: No heightened-liberty standard applied |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000) (district courts have broad discretion to alter supervised-release conditions)
- United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizes broad authority to approve modification of supervised-release conditions)
- United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2011) (§ 3583(e)(2) does not require a finding of changed circumstances prior to modification)
- United States v. Davies, 380 F.3d 329 (8th Cir. 2004) (modification may be permissible absent changed circumstances)
- United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1997) (discusses circumstances justifying modification but does not impose a changed-circumstances prerequisite)
- United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2012) (notes § 3583(e)(2) contains no changed-circumstances requirement)
- United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) (heightened findings required when a condition implicates a particularly significant liberty interest)
- United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (psychosexual testing does not implicate a particularly significant liberty interest)