51 F.4th 658
6th Cir.2022Background
- George E. Skouteris Jr., a Memphis personal-injury lawyer and former college football player, routinely settled clients’ cases without their knowledge, forged client endorsements on settlement checks, and deposited proceeds into his Trust One Bank accounts.
- Victims (including Tiffany Williams) learned of settlements only after the fact, sometimes receiving partial funds years later; complaints led to state charges, disbarment, and a federal indictment for seven counts of bank fraud (2007–2013 conduct).
- At trial Skouteris argued diminished mental capacity (including possible CTE, depression, alcohol use disorder, seizure disorder) undermined the mens rea for bank fraud; the government presented client testimony and a government psychologist concluding he was capable of forming complex plans.
- The jury convicted on all seven counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1); the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 46–57 months, applied enhancements for loss, abuse of trust, and substantial financial hardship, and imposed a downward variance to 30 months’ imprisonment plus restitution of $147,406 (Williams awarded $77,882).
- On appeal Skouteris challenged sufficiency of the evidence (mens rea), the district court’s refusal to give a diminished-capacity instruction and 404(b) limiting instructions, Guidelines calculations (loss amount; §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(iii) enhancement), denial of a §5K2.13 departure, substantive reasonableness of sentence, and the restitution amounts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for §1344(1) (scheme and mens rea) | United States: Evidence of repeated forgeries, deception, and expert/lay testimony supports that Skouteris knowingly executed a scheme to defraud an FDIC-insured bank. | Skouteris: Lacked requisite mens rea; claimed actual/apparent authority or mere negligence; some clients received money. | Affirmed: Circumstantial and testimonial evidence supported knowledge; §1344(1) requires knowledge (not purposeful intent). |
| Jury instruction on diminished capacity / CTE | United States: District court instructions adequately explained mens rea and innocence defenses; no special CTE instruction required. | Skouteris: Requested instruction that diminished capacity (CTE) could negate “specific intent” to violate law; saying purposefulness was required. | Affirmed: District court did not abuse discretion; §1344(1) requires knowledge, and the given instructions substantially covered defendant’s theory. |
| Guidelines loss calculation and inclusion of unindicted conduct | United States: Presentence report’s intended-loss (face value of forged checks) properly used; relevant conduct may include unindicted acts. | Skouteris: Loss overstated; some victims’ actual losses were less than face amounts; unindicted acts shouldn’t be included. | Affirmed: No plain error; intended loss per U.S.S.G. commentary and relevant-conduct rule permit using face value and related unindicted conduct. |
| §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(iii) enhancement for substantial financial hardship to Williams | United States: Williams suffered substantial medical bills, credit damage, and long-term harm caused by deprivation of settlement funds; causation satisfied. | Skouteris: Enhancement improper because foreseeability of Williams taking student loans was lacking (new argument on appeal). | Affirmed: No plain error; record supports that theft caused substantial, foreseeable financial harm to Williams. |
| Restitution amounts and liens | United States: MVRA restitution mandatory to identified victims; amounts as calculated supported. | Skouteris: Some awards should be reduced (e.g., attorney’s fees, liens); disputed actual loss figures. | Affirmed: Skouteris waived or forfeited many restitution challenges; liens do not reduce defendant’s obligation (they affect priority). |
Key Cases Cited
- Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63 (2016) (§1344(1) requires knowledge that one likely will deprive a bank of property, not a specific purpose to do so)
- Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014) (discusses how statutory "knowingly" informs mens rea analysis)
- United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409 (1st Cir. 1994) (formulated a three-part test and the historic "intent to defraud" framing)
- United States v. Hoglund, 178 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 1999) (adopted a three-element test for §1344 offenses)
- United States v. Everett, 270 F.3d 986 (6th Cir. 2001) (held that defendant’s intent to defraud persons other than the bank can support §1344 liability)
- United States v. Hall, 979 F.3d 1107 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussed elements and review approach for §1344 convictions)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial evidence)