United States v. George McLeod, III, 972 F.3d 637

George McLeod III pleaded guilty to interstate transportation for prostitution (Count 7) and aggravated identity theft (Count 6); the plea agreement did not mention sex-offender registration.
At plea colloquy the government and court warned registration “may” apply; at sentencing the court corrected prior advisals and asked McLeod whether to affirm his plea; he affirmed.
The district court sentenced McLeod to 70 months imprisonment and five years supervised release, and imposed a condition requiring sex-offender registration.
McLeod did not appeal. After release (while on supervised release) he filed a pro se motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) to remove the registration requirement, arguing his convictions did not qualify as SORNA “sex offenses.”
The district court denied the motion, concluding Count 6 (aggravated identity theft) rendered him a registrant as a specified offense against a minor; McLeod appealed and this Court dismissed the appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (McLeod)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether McLeod's broad plea waiver bars his § 3583(e)(2) challenge	Waiver does not cover a § 3583(e)(2) motion attacking the legality of a supervised-release condition	Waiver broadly bars post-conviction challenges, including this motion	Waiver unenforceable here — an express waiver cannot bar review of an allegedly illegal sentence/condition (illegal-sentence exception); appeal not blocked by waiver
Whether § 3583(e)(2) may be used to challenge the legality of a supervised-release condition long after sentencing	§ 3583(e)(2) is a proper vehicle to remove an unlawful registration requirement under changed circumstances or legal interpretation	§ 3583(e)(2) cannot be used as an end-run around the time-limited avenues for challenging a sentence; legality challenges must be raised at sentencing, on direct appeal, or via timely collateral attack	§ 3583(e)(2) can authorize modification for new or unforeseen factual or legal changes, but not for challenges based on the same facts/legal arguments available at sentencing; McLeod’s claim was forfeited (he could have objected/appealed), so appeal dismissed

United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143 (4th Cir. 1995) (appeal waiver does not bar challenge to an unauthorized restitution order; illegal-sentence exception)
United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 1997) (§ 3583(e)(2) does not permit challenges to the legality of conditions of supervised release)
United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding some legality challenges may be cognizable under § 3583(e)(2) when tied to new circumstances)
United States v. Faber, 950 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2020) (rejecting § 3583(e)(2) as vehicle for illegality challenges)
United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting § 3583(e)(2) to bar rescission of allegedly illegal conditions)
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638 (4th Cir. 2013) (a district court may reference unenumerated § 3553(a) factors when intertwined with the enumerated factors, but may not base action predominantly on unlisted factors)
United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2000) (an express waiver will not bar appeal when the sentence was imposed in excess of the law)